UKNDA (UK National Defence Association)
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TRI-SERVICE
EVERYBODY’S PROBLEM - THE NEED FOR DEFENCE
A paper by and for members of the
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.
2. The Armed Forces.
2.1 - The British Army
2.2 - The Royal Navy
2.3. - The Royal Air Force
3. Forces Rationale.
3.1 - Security Blanket Syndrome
3.2 - Government Policy - NATO and The EU
3.3 - International Factors - Democracy Versus Autocracy
3.4 - Public and Political Perceptions
4. The Threat Problem.
4.1 - Strategic Threat
4.2 - The Trade Threat
5. The Armed Forces Required.
5.1 - The Criteria
5.2 - The Tasks Assigned
5.3 - The Roles and Composition
5.4 - Overseas Operations
5.5 - Options for Change
5.6 - Strategic Defence Review 1998 (SDR98)
5.7 - SDR 98 Revision (2003) - Delivering Security in a Changing World
5.8 - Planning Assumptions - Worst Case Example
5.9 - Readiness Criteria
6. Summary.
7. Scenarios & Case Studies.
7.1 - Navy - Mine Counter Measures - The Threat to
7.2 - Joint Operations - The
7.3 - RAF - Just in Time Logistics Maybe Just Too Late
7.4 - Army -
8. Acknowledgements.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper, written by ordinary members of the UK National Defence Association (UKNDA), is an attempt to look at the need for UK armed forces and the reasons why they must be adequately funded to carryout all the tasks identified and assigned. It is written in plain language, avoiding too much technical detail, in order to offer the widest appeal. In considering the scope and aims of this Paper it seemed important not to assume any prior knowledge by the reader and to set the background by forming an overview, and consequently, the paper looks at a brief ‘potted’ history of the armed forces and then goes on to consider the issues and reasons for having defence forces in a modern world examining, in broad terms, what conventional forces (i.e. non-nuclear), may be needed and in what roles. The paper represents the personal views of the authors and is not intended to be an academic study nor does it constitute the official UKNDA view. However, it has been written in as logical a structure as possible. It draws on professional experience and contemporary published material, with each major heading leading on to the next, supported, at the end, by several scenarios and case studies which may help the reader understand some of the specific difficulties and problems associated with under-funding our Armed Forces.
2. THE ARMED FORCES
2.1 The British Army. Until the Acts of Union in 1707 the term ‘British Army’ had not really existed and until the English Civil War, large field armies were rarely maintained in peacetime, being expensive and undesirable to the civilian population and Parliament. Thus, as threats developed towards the homeland and emergent overseas territories, so did the size of the army. As the army grew in size so did its complexity, with new technology being developed and introduced in the form of more powerful artillery, small arms, field communications and tactics - by 1916 with tanks and aircraft. In 1907, the Territorial Force (The TA) was introduced to act as a properly trained reinforcement component for the regular army. Although conscription was introduced during the first and second world wars - it was finally ended in 1960 - modern training is considered too complex and lengthy for its reintroduction.
The British Army was greatly expanded during WWII and amphibious mechanised warfare, supported by air and naval assets, became common place. Post WWII, terrorism from the jungles of Malaya to the urban environment of Northern Ireland and the bush of Kenya to the deserts of Oman provided the army with a unique mix of skills for which new tactics and new equipment were required, often at short notice and at some cost. However, there was a complication; all this was occurring against the backdrop of UK’s obligation to provide forces in support of national, UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) commitments - Korea, Cyprus, Falklands and British Army Of the Rhine (BAOR) - all at a time of increasing Soviet threat.
Today, the Soviet threat has evaporated, yet the army is committed on a major battle front -
2.2 The Royal Navy. Like the army the origins of the modern Royal Navy (RN) can be traced back to Acts of Union in 1707 which led to the amalgamation of the Scottish and English Navies. As an island race, with thousands of miles of coast line and international trade dependant upon safe sea transit, a strong navy has always been a prerequisite for defence of the
To support these global interests a naval base infrastructure was created, from Malta and Gibraltar in the Mediterranean and to Singapore and Hong Kong in the Far East By WWI, Germany had caught up in ship design, if not in numbers, but, following the battle of Jutland, the German Navy was sufficiently battered to leave the lions share of the sea war to their new weapon, the ‘U Boat‘. For the rest of WWI and all of WWII ‘unrestricted’ submarine warfare focussed RN attention. Therefore, protection of
By the mid 1970’s all the naval bases ‘East of Suez had gone and with them the large expensive aircraft carriers and battle cruisers - now thought redundant in the NATO role. The modern concept was for a navy based around highly capable frigates and destroyers with hunter killer submarines offering force protection below the surface and land based aircraft and missile systems offering protection above. Only the advent of Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL) Harrier jump jets, led to a rethink and the RN received new ships - the Invincible Class carrier - which would prove to be so crucial in the
Today, the RN has 25 destroyers and frigates, 16 Mine Counter Measures vessels, 9 submarines and 3 carriers (notionally) but no dedicated VSTOL aircraft - the Sea Harrier having been retired early. The support fleet consists of 6 tankers and 4 Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) support ships and the service has been reduced to approximately 32,000 men (38000 when the Royal Marines are included).
2.3 The Royal Air Force. The Royal Air Force (RAF) is the youngest of the 3 services and is the only one with an exact date of birth - 1st April 1918. However, the origins of the RAF can be traced back to the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS).
The proponents of air power considered themselves to be visionaries at a time when there were many sceptics. These air-power enthusiasts believed that the aircraft had a future almost without limits and that this future would herald the end of ground warfare as then understood. To an extent they were proved right, but not in all respects and certainly not in the misplaced belief that the aeroplane could win wars alone. However, the visionaries were proved right on one crucial level, without total air supremacy, or, at the very least, local air superiority, surface forces could no longer operate freely being vulnerable to enemy air attack. Air power had not only proved its worth but had come of age and become indispensable.
In the 1920’s and 1930’s RAF aircraft successfully policed vast areas of the expanded ’Empire’, and a few RAF aircraft showed the flag, and maintained order. Around the world, airbases were established, creating new command structures and it was with this structure that the RAF, relatively newly equipped with mono-planes, entered WWII. Operating in every theatre of war - from the Far and Middle East to
Post WWII, the RAF entered the jet age. New British manufactured aircraft entered service, albeit with increasingly high price tags and the next generation of RAF aircraft would be either collaborative or foreign imports. However, the price tags continued to escalate, inevitably leading to cuts in numbers as the capabilities of the aircraft improved and the perceived threat changed. UK air defence, a major priority during the ’Cold War’, now takes a back seat to expeditionary warfare and whilst in the Soviet era the RAF would operate, in the main, from its own well-found bases, now they must deploy worldwide into more primitive airfields and take what they need to operate with them.
Whilst the total number of transport aircraft has fallen by around 10% over the past 20 years, the support helicopter fleet has plummeted by 40% (107 in 1987 to 67 today) as has the ground attack force, but the most drastic reduction has been in air defence aircraft - down from 259 in 1987 to 91 today. The RAF has a current strength of approximately 42,000 personnel but is slated to be reduced further to 39,000.
3. FORCES RATIONALE
3.1 Security Blanket Syndrome. Even a superficial study of national budgets demonstrates that most countries spend something on defence forces (some a lot more than others) and those that appear not to, often have ’dependency’ or ’protected’ status and rely upon other nations for security. At root, the majority of nation states feel the need for armed protection through alliances or self funded armed forces - even the
In considering what factors drive this need for armed forces, and there are several, the two principal reasons are defence and offence. In the former case, border integrity, driven by a history of establishing an independent sense of ’nationhood’ seems to be the primary driver, often dictated by past belligerence from another nation’s offensive forces. This may seem to be stating the obvious but there are curious exceptions which need to be considered - like that of
It would appear that history, some quite recent, has taught most national governments that the simple act of neutrality is no guarantee of peace or a cast iron deterrence to an aggressor. Indeed, when a country has no military treaty obligations - is non-aligned -the requirement for strong armed forces or a timid foreign policy appears to be a prerequisite. If a nation is not allied by treaty to a strong friend then it must be ready to defend its own territory or attempt to stand aside from international conflict through diplomacy - sometimes through appeasement. Contrast Britain‘s weak defence position pre and post 1939 in respect of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Some countries prefer not to spend large sums on defence forces and rely upon other nations for this support. In NATO, Iceland and Luxemburg have no serious armed forces but participate politically and allow their territory to be used by NATO nations for military purposes. Whether offering political support as an offset for hard military expenditure is a reasonable trade-off, is an open question, but the fact remains that both Iceland and Luxemburg share protection under Article 5 of the NATO Charter - an attack on one is considered an attack on all - and despite their own lack of forces still subscribe to the concept of strong defence. (The security blanket syndrome).
Therefore, for countries like Britain, with treaty obligations, the use of force may not initially be in direct defence of the homeland but in the cause of another - Belgium 1914, Poland 1939 and Kuwait 1991.
3.2 Government Policy - NATO and the EU. Overarching all national decisions on the formation, funding, rationale and use of the armed forces is Government Policy, especially foreign policy. In the UK there are established (inherited) armed services - RN (including RM), Army and RAF. This inherited aspect is important because any political party on attaining power has its own agenda in respect of defence and it cannot always be taken for granted that these aspirations will always be pro-armed forces. It may be that a government, on taking office, may wish to maintain some armed forces (the security blanket syndrome) but not necessarily in their current form or size. Furthermore, currently, neither the Liberal Democrats nor Conservative opposition parties have clearly declared their defence spending intentions and may wish to have a defence review before committing themselves should they come to power.
At times the Government of the day will commit British Forces without fully understanding the funding implications and this can lead to a mismatch between aspirations and reality. Our current government has committed British forces in support of the US ‘War on Terror’ and to concurrent NATO, UN and EU sponsored operations for political reasons but seems reluctant to fully fund them. (The latter issue of EU defence policy is possibly a ‘red herring’ for Britain because NATO is still the bedrock of UK defence policy).
However, the EU is not prevented from attempting to influence British defence posture through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) so this dimension should not be discarded lightly but may be viewed with a certain degree of scepticism. The main issue being that only France and UK, within the EU, have the capabilities required to operate across the full war fighting spectrum - and the French have been reluctant to support UK foreign policy thus far. Therefore, any EU foreign policy decision to commit EU forces would have to fall disproportionately on the UK and/or France. Furthermore, there are major diplomatic and procedural difficulties to be overcome before British foreign policy - still allied to the USA - can match EU aspirations. The latter issue is a particular problem in the area of defence intelligence sharing which is non-negotiable as far as the USA is concerned.
Therefore, if the EU is not the current driver of UK defence policy what is the political rationale for British armed forces?
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the closest ally of the USA, with overseas territories to defend and as an original signatory to the NATO Charter the UK does and will, for the foreseeable future, find its foreign policy being dictated by these commitments. Whilst there may be a case for armed forces purely on national grounds the fact is, since the 1960’s, UK forces have only once been committed to a major military operation overseas without acting in concert with an ally - the Falklands War. However, the forces used to retake the islands came from NATO assigned units and in future this is still likely to be the case.
3.3 International Factors - Democracy Versus Autocracy. Domestic policy may have a bearing on whether autocracies maintain large forces (suppression of the population, maintenance of power), but in the democracies it is more likely to be overseas national interests, treaty obligations, resource competition and a desire to prevent hegemony by another nation that will drive the need.
Despite much effort being directed towards inter-governmental co-operation through international institutions such as the UN, World Trade Organisation (WTO), G8, G20, African Union (AU) et al, the achievements have been sporadic and rarely sustained. Autocratic countries continue to ignore basic human rights and the border integrity of neighbours; armed disputes over borders abound, persecution of indigenous people is widespread and global competition for scarce resources has already begun. Against this backdrop it seems inevitable that autocracies will continue to arm themselves (some with nuclear weapons) in order to coerce others. Whilst the democracies - often through alliances - are forced to respond in kind until international dialogue becomes the universally accepted medium for solving these disputes.
3.4 Public and Political Perception. In considering both the ’security blanket’ and ’inherited’ armed forces concepts it is important to take into account public perception and its effect on political support for the armed forces. Not an easy concept to quantify with any degree of certainty (albeit that polls show overwhelming public support for the armed forces) and as a consequence, without further study, constitutes an arguable personal view.
Oliver Cromwell reputedly said that “England without a King is unthinkable” and in the same way this sentiment appears to be held by the majority of the British public for their armed forces. Like the monarch, the British forces would appear to be seen as symbolic of the country’s ethos, lose either one and everything irrevocably changes - the loss of that intangible essence which makes up a sense of‘ Nationhood’. However, logic dictates that tradition alone cannot ensure continued public support especially when the tax burden begins to make the pips squeak! Therefore, beyond the sentimental must be a pragmatic attitude which instinctively leaves the British public with a desire to see strong defences. But even beyond this, given that all service personnel are somebody’s mother, father, daughter, son or friend, it is reasonable to assume that support for the armed forces is more than simply a desire for self protection - it is also a quintessentially personal affair.
If the above view were not intuitively correct why do politicians try so hard, against contrary evidence, to present the case, across the political divide, that they fully support the armed forces. Do they not constantly remind the public that the “first duty of government is defence of the realm”? Fine sentiments, but in a political ‘dog eat dog’ world - complicated by competing budgetary requirements and no new money on offer - this could be construed as more a desire to appeal to public perception than a genuine commitment to spend more on defence.
4. THE THREAT PROBLEM
4.1 Strategic Threat. The UK is a global trading nation with worldwide commercial and resource interests formed over centuries of coercive and cooperative ventures. Despite relative harmony in the global trading markets, Britain’s colonial past has affected the UK’s ability to influence some former colonies and less friendly states diplomatically and commercially. This may not seem to be a problem ordinarily but could prove a restriction to future military operations, hampering our ability to take action if cooperation for over-flights, basing or transit is denied - EG how could we intervene in Zimbabwe if South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana refused to assist? (The latter always being a major factor in any service assisted or protected evacuation plan and a boost to supporters of aircraft carriers).
As European influence wanes, especially in Africa, other nations - most notably China - fill the void. Even the USA is finding the exercise of global influence more difficult with the emergence of Chinese, Russian and Indian economic and military strength. To this end Korea and Taiwan pose real points of friction as does the Middle East, most especially Iran, and closer to the contiguous USA the anti-American sentiment of Venezuela is a cause for very real concern. One does not need to dig too deep to find that resources - oil, gas, minerals, food stocks and water - along with nuclear weapons, are the cause of the friction. Hence, it is this competition for the worlds resources that is likely to be the major driver of the future need for UK armed forces, albeit primarily in alliance with the UN, NATO and EU.
With a more assertive Russian foreign policy already rekindling a ’Cold War’ form of diplomacy in the NATO sphere of influence (Georgia) and China exercising its economic muscle in Africa and the Middle East, whilst at the same time exerting national claims to other territories - Taiwan and Tibet - military confrontation cannot be ruled out. Indeed, notwithstanding current African ambivalence to Western interference in local affairs, UN intervention in Somalia and Sudan - maybe even Zimbabwe - may still require NATO or EU forces.
4.2 The Trade Threat. Whilst approximately 60% of UK trade is conducted through the EU this leaves 40% of UK transactions being conducted in the global market place and a significant amount of European trade originates outside the EU. This makes continuity of supply a major defence priority - not least alone in the area of energy and food security. Therefore, in assessing the threat to UK commerce, not just continental Europe must be considered as of vital interest, but those areas of the world with which we trade. In this context it is important to note that whilst a small percentage of import/export is airlifted, by far the largest proportion (90%) moves by surface means - sea, rail and road.
In war time, against a well equipped enemy navy, shipping can be corralled into convoys and protected by escort vessels (if enough RN surface vessels are available), however, in peace time or in periods of low intensity conflict, ships travel independently and without escort - the vast majority plying their trade without mishap. That having been said, it is recognised that piracy is on the increase, that maritime-terrorism is already a real concern and unarmed merchant ships are easy prey even for an unsophisticated enemy. The difficulty that must be overcome is that of providing escorts for high priority/sensitive cargos on an ad hoc basis whilst at the same time offering naval security world wide without becoming overstretched. And this argues the case for an expanded navy that can operate independently of allies if necessary.
Equally, security of priority/sensitive cargo sent by air, road and rail, especially at choke points, (EG The English Channel Ports) must be considered along with the essential inter-service command and control relationship between the UK armed forces and border protection agencies - Police, Customs, Coast Guard, Intelligence and, Immigration. And this argues the case for integrated homeland security?
5. THE ARMED FORCES REQUIRED
5.1 The Criteria. When addressing the criteria for The Armed Forces it is important to put aside the monetary considerations which, although a factor for future government spending policy, should not influence a clearly defined evaluation. To this end some of the criteria to be considered are: the Tasks Assigned, the Roles required, the Composition and the Readiness Criteria.
5.2 The Tasks Assigned. The tasks assigned to HM Forces have a direct correlation to the assessed threats to be faced. In home defence these would range from terrorism and counter insurgency to border security and emergencies requiring aid to the civil power. In the case of overseas operations, foreign policy - often in support of NATO or UN operations and, in extremis, full war fighting - would set the agenda. In the recent past this latter tasking has taken the form of peacekeeping (Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone), counter insurgency (Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan), anti-piracy (Somalia), and full war fighting (The Falklands, Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan).
5.3 The Roles and Composition. Clearly there is a requirement for home defence, especially in the border protection and anti-terrorism roles, but this can be achieved with relatively small numbers of Special Forces and associated support - air defence jets, bomb disposal, intelligence and border guards. There is also a requirement to enhance these forces with RN coastal patrol vessels, RAF/RN helicopters and unmanned air reconnaissance vehicles to support the police, border forces and inaptly named and under resourced, Coast Guard. At times, larger numbers of tri-service personnel may be required to aid the civil powers in an emergency - Fire Fighting, Floods, Epidemics etc, but the resources required are rarely excessive and, with the exception of times of General War, available from home based units. However, as Britain’s airspace is now being probed in echoes of the ’Cold War’, the UK Air Defence Ground Environment (radar units) and the associated air defence squadrons (currently there are only a dozen F3 fighters allocated to defend the UK’s Northern skies), must be given due attention as indeed should the RN’s ability to provide mine counter measures for the protection of British ports and anti-submarine forces for operations in the North Sea and North Atlantic. (See Scenario/Case Study at 7.1 - Navy)
Given the UK’s obvious desire to fight the ‘war on terror’ at source rather than on the British mainland, coupled to its NATO and UN obligations, the issue of overseas operations immediately becomes apparent. Therefore, as, in recent history, British Forces have conducted all major operations (except Northern Ireland) abroad - Falklands, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo - an expeditionary capability must be assumed a pre-requisite. This assumption dictates that strategic sea and air lift become a priority and that logistic support (in the widest sense) must be geared accordingly. (See Scenario/Case Study at 7.3 - RAF). Therefore, protection of the line of communication (Support routes) becomes self evident and appropriate forces must be assigned, alongside the necessary combat elements, to achieve this. Whatever the forces assigned to an overseas operation, protection of the Support Routes will involve RN, RAF and ground forces specially allocated, trained and equipped for the task. Currently this Support Route security task appears to be ad hoc, relying more on luck than judgement, to ensure that essential reinforcements and re-supply arrives safely.
5.4 Overseas Operations. By definition, any deployment of UK forces beyond these shores constitutes an overseas operation and presents the greatest challenge. Such operations may vary from garrison duties to full war fighting, often at some considerable distance from the home base, and it is here where the force size, operational duration and concurrency assumptions must be clearly defined in advance. Whilst individual service personnel and units may be trained in the UK to meet a planned role, without the correct planning assumptions against which to calculate the formation size and the equipment, administration and logistic support required, any overseas operation will be fraught with difficulty - possibly not even viable. This is why (theoretically) the Government funds and tasks the MOD to work from set assumptions and since the mid 1990’s these assumptions have seen several changes.
5.5 Options for Change. In the mid 1990’s The Options for Change planning assumptions were that 3 levels of force might be required, referred to as, Contingency Force (Divisional level), Formation Force (Brigade level) and Unit Level (Company) strength. It was assumed that a Contingency Force, similar to the First Gulf War (1991), could be an all out war fighting effort, in conjunction with allies, and that after 6 months it would either be replaced in-theatre by another nation or would have completed the task assigned. In either case the force would return to UK for rest, recuperation and retraining and it could not redeploy for up to 2 years. It could not be conducted at the same time as a Formation Level which could be a very long term operation requiring full rotation of all the personnel every 6 months. However, up to 3 Unit Level operations could be maintained on a rolling basis alongside an ongoing Formation level deployment.
5.6 Strategic Defence Review (SDR 1998). The SDR 98 defence review modified the above assumptions and called for the ability to field a large force - 1 armoured division, 26 major warships and 80 combat aircraft - as per the first Gulf War, or to conduct an extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale - as per Bosnia. At the same time the forces had to retain the ability to mount a second substantial deployment which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces - if made necessary by a second crisis. It was not expected that both would involve war fighting or to operate them simultaneously longer than six months.
5.7 SDR 98 Revision - Delivering Security in a Changing World (2003). In the Government White Paper ‘Delivering Security In A Changing World (2003)‘ the following amendment to SDR 98 was made “…Ability to support 3 simultaneous small to medium scale operations…one an enduring peace-keeping mission (e.g. Kosovo)” and “ The ability, at longer notice, to deploy forces in a large scale operation while running a concurrent small scale operation”. In attempting to define what a small and medium scale operation constituted the paper defined small as around 1000 to1500 personnel and medium as around 2000- 3000 personnel. Large scale was defined as a Gulf War size operation (up to 45,000 personnel) albeit that it must be assumed that the forces necessary would take several months to assemble and require other operations to be wound down.
5.8 Planning Assumptions - A Worst Case Example. In any deployment of the armed forces it is imperative that the planning assumptions are known in advance because it is against these assumptions that the force required is funded, manned, equipped and structured. Whilst the armed forces are able and willing to work beyond these planning assumptions for short periods, the long term effect is one of steady degradation and overstretch. (See Scenario/Case Study at 7.4 - Army).
To take one very recent example: Until the Spring of 2009 the British forces were committed to two major operations in Iraq (4000 personnel) and Afghanistan (8000 personnel). Taken together these long term operations had been overlapping for at least 3 years, and with 12000 personnel deployed, constituted a 25% overextension of the forces against the 2003 funded worst case planning assumptions. The problem is compounded because upwards of 8% of the forces are on leave at one time and another 10% ineffective due to illness - others will be in the training system or on courses. This reduces the effective manning figure by at least another 20%.
Hence, since the wind down of British forces in Iraq, it has been politically problematic for the government to fund even one small brigade of 2500 troops, and the necessary air support, to reinforce Operation ‘Panther’s Claw’ in Afghanistan. This, despite the head of the army, arguing that the reinforcement was essential for success of the operation and calls from the NATO commander for more troops.
5.9 Readiness Criteria. However, it is one thing to have an agreed force level, supported by reservists, but readiness criteria if not properly addressed can severely hamper the time-scale against which any force is deployed and the effective training level of that force. If the requirement is at short notice then there is an increased risk that under-trained personnel may find themselves in-theatre attempting to acclimatise and learn the task whilst conducting operations against hostile forces. A far from ideal situation. Therefore, force readiness can be seen as both a function of availability of personnel and training time. However, as one senior officer once remarked “ at which point do we recognise that the deployment clock is ticking”?
For these reasons it is an essential requirement for personnel and units to be trained prior to deployment, especially in an era of ‘asymmetric warfare‘ (IE terrorism & counter insurgency) where the threat and challenges are constantly changing. It follows that reservists and regulars alike must be assigned as early as possible to a role in order to ensure the force size and make-up is known and the requisite pre-deployment exercises can take place before contact with the enemy. This will inevitably mean that some formations and equipment must be pre-established and pre-assigned with consequent implications on manning for other tasks. The smaller a particular specialist group the more often it will be tasked and the opportunity for rest and retraining for new assignments, reduced accordingly - Support Helicopter, Air Transport and Ground Attack aircrew, Medical and Logistic personnel, Bomb Disposal teams, Infantry, Special Forces and RN Seamen all falling into this category.
6. SUMMARY
The British Forces are well established and, with the worthy exception of the RAF, have long histories, but whether these histories are short or long, they tell of professional and dedicated service to the Crown. Today the forces are committed to more overseas war fighting tasks with fewer personnel and less equipment than at any other comparable period. That their equipment is lacking at times is beyond question - playing catch up has always been the lot of the UK armed forces - but they get on with the job. The question is, given the modern day threats from terrorism, counter insurgency, resource deficiencies, natural disasters and mans inhumanity to man, whether they are correctly funded and configured to meet the tasks they are assigned?
It has been stated by all the main political parties that what is needed is ‘Balanced Forces’. This has been restated in the Governments Defence White Paper (SDR98) as revised in 2003. That being the case, and allowing for a professional rebalancing of the current Order of Battle, the Armed Forces must be structured and sized to provide a truly global expeditionary capability able to undertake high intensity war fighting, engage in asymmetric warfare, protection of ports, sea and air lanes, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and defence of British territory. To accomplish this, more emphasis must be placed on the strategic and tactical lift capabilities of the RN and RAF along with air power weapons that can enable state of the art support to an enlarged and properly equipped field army. (See Scenario/Case Study at 7.2 - Joint Operations - Falklands).
Finally, the planning assumptions regarding force role, type, concurrency and length of deployment, having been identified by the Government, must be funded and adhered to. To do otherwise is a fools errand which will inevitably lead to confusion in political circles and overstretch within the armed forces. Defence on the cheap is not an option - once the threats have been identified and the tasks assigned and agreed, the ways and means must be found. The lives of our servicemen and women are at stake.
7. SCENARIOS
7.1 ROYAL NAVY - Mine Counter Measures the Threat to UK Ports
UK Strategic and Commercial Threats
This short paper examines the perceived threat to United Kingdom commercial and strategic interests in the event of mines being deployed by terrorists or other non-benign parties interested in disrupting British national interests for their own aims. As part of this discussion, it will be necessary to look at the Royal Navy (RN) assets available to counter such an eventuality, why mining is such an effective method of naval warfare, and how relatively easy it is to conduct. Bear in mind that the former Soviet Union had a large war stock of mines, and it is far from clear as to what became of them when the union dissolved in the early 90s.
A naval mine is a self-contained explosive device placed in water to destroy ships or submarines. Unlike depth charges, mines are deposited and left to wait until they are triggered by the approach of or contact with an enemy ship. Naval mines can be used offensively, to hamper enemy ships or lock them into a harbour; or defensively, to protect friendly ships and create "safe" zones. Mines can be laid in many ways: by purpose-built minelayers, refitted ships, submarines, or aircraft - and even by dropping them into a harbour by hand. They can be inexpensive: some variants can cost as little as a thousand US dollars. Their flexibility and cost-effectiveness make mines attractive weapons to the less powerful belligerents, especially terrorists. The cost of producing and laying a mine is usually anywhere from 0.5% to 10% of the cost of removing it, and it can take up to 200 times as long to clear a minefield as to lay it. It is for this reason that parts of some World War II naval minefields still exist - they are too extensive and expensive to clear.
CURRENT ROYAL NAVY ASSETS.
The RN currently has 8 Hunt class Mine Counter Measure vessels (MCMV‘s) [2nd Mine Countermeasures Squadron: MCM2] based at Portsmouth and 8 Sandown class MCMV’s [1st Mine Countermeasures Squadron: MCM1] based at HM Naval Base Clyde, located at Faslane. The Hunts were completed between 1981-89, the Sandowns from 1992-2001, and all are Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP - non-magnetic). The Hunts are planned to leave active service between 2019-23 but all are reported to have hulls in good material condition, although it is acknowledged that the difficulties associated with the operation and maintenance of aging main and auxiliary machinery need to be addressed, and there is a programme to replace the main engines, generators, bow thrusters and propellers in the next few years. HMS Ledbury was completed in 1981, however, the class can be regarded as state of the art as far as MCM capability is concerned, being fitted with hull mounted sonar (sound navigation and ranging system), a command and control system, and the Seafox expendable mine disposal system, which replaces the older PAP ‘yellow submarine” which many may remember. One of the Seafox’s great advantages is that the new system is two man portable, making it much easier to launch and recover than its predecessor. .
DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY
At present, 4 MCMVs [2 Hunt class and 2 Sandown class] are based at Bahrain for operations in the north of the Gulf, and 1 or 2 are routinely attached to NATO MCM squadrons in the Mediterranean and/or Atlantic. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that 5 vessels are deployed away from the UK, that 2 Hunts are in major refit, and that 2 other MCMVs are in some form of maintenance at any one time. This would leave 7 ships, of which 2 would require to be brought forward to operational standard. One might also assume that, 2 would be required to safeguard outbound departing submarines from Faslane, and perhaps, depending on the perceived threat, units might be deployed to Devonport. This does not leave much of a margin of assets to combat a known or perceived threat to ports in other parts of the British Isles.
However, these assets can be enhanced by additional, Explosive Ordnance Disposal [EOD] teams located within the naval bases (if not deployed elsewhere), and such personnel might be deployed to operate new unmanned reconnaissance vehicles which are designed to operate in depths of 30 – 200m. It is understood that these devices, which use a simple but robust cage to launch and recover them, can be operated from any small vessel fitted with a one tonne crane. There may also be a call upon special forces in some circumstances to make use of their specialist skills in relation to hull attached devices.
THE SCENARIO
The purpose of this scenario is to stimulate discussion about a subject which government seems to have conveniently shut in a cupboard. Whilst in Aden in late 2006 and early 2007 the author met with shipbrokers and insurers from the UK, all seafarers with first class foreign going certificates and therefore seagoing experience, who were supervising the transport of steel to Yemen from China. Most of the conversations regarding mining centred around the Gulf of Aden, and the Straits of Hormuz, but all agreed that the threat of mining to the United Kingdom was real [at least to seafarers] and was under the horizon as far as the present administration was concerned. Perhaps it is therefore timely to make a wake-up call.
POSSIBLE TARGET PORTS AND LOCATIONS
Three areas have been chosen because of their strategic and commercial importance to the United Kingdom - Milford Haven, Southampton and The Clyde Estuary. Readers may agree that there are many others of equal importance. However, given the ease with which even an unsophisticated enemy could seed mines, it is hoped that the following will serve as an illustration of the potential upheaval which could be caused by mining.
MILFORD HAVEN
Situated in Pembrokeshire, Milford Haven is by far the largest port in Wales, and is the sixth largest in the United Kingdom. With the run down of North Sea gas, it will become the most important liquefied natural gas [LNG] handling facility in Britain, and by the time the second facility is on stream later in 2009, around 30% of the country’s gas requirements will be able to be processed through the port. At present, 25% of the United Kingdom’s petrol and diesel provisions are handled in the Haven, making it one of the most important energy hubs in Britain. Disabling the port by mining the approaches to the waterway which then resulted in the sinking or destruction of either a very large crude carrier (VLCC) or an LNG carrier could have fundamentally serious consequences for the national economy, causing months of potential disruption.
SOUTHAMPTON
Many naval and other seafaring readers will be familiar with Southampton, and its approaches. Presently it handles in excess of 42 million tonnes of cargo per annum, which represents circa 7% of United Kingdom seaborne trade, and is an important gateway for imports from the Far and Middle East, including car transporting and crude oil imports/export through the ESSO Fawley refinery and BP Hamble depot. The port is equipped to handle any type of cargo, and has the second largest container port in the country, handling up to the largest of deep sea container ships. In addition, it is the most important of the country’s cruise liner terminals, and this industry continues to grow year upon year. The port is situated on a natural deep water harbour, and Southampton water is also the location of the Marchwood military port, which is of significant importance to the army. Therefore, mining of the approaches to the port and its subsequent blocking by, say, a damaged or sunken container ship would cause widespread disruption and damage, not only to the nation’s economy, but could also disrupt military deployments.
THE CLYDE ESTUARY
As commercial ports, both Greenock and Glasgow have diminished over the last twenty or so years, and do not rank in importance with many other ports in the south and east of the United Kingdom. However, as commercial activity has declined, so the importance of the river to the military has increased. There have always been submarines based on the river. With the demise of Rosyth on the River Forth as a naval port, HM Naval Base, Clyde has taken on a much enhanced role, being the home of the Clyde Submarine Base [HMS Neptune] which hosts conventional and nuclear armed submarines. It is also the base port of the 8 Sandown class MCMVs, as well as host to all types of RN and allied naval surface ships from time to time throughout the year. Facilities within the Queen’s Harbour include Coulport, the home of the UK Independent Nuclear deterrent at Trident jetty, and the armament jetty for Glen Mallan in Loch Long. The base itself is to the east of the mouth of Loch Long, in the Gareloch with facilities which include the oil fuel depot at Loch Striven.
The Firth of Clyde runs from Greenock [The Tail o’ the Bank] to its confluence with the North Channel and Irish Sea. Therefore, all traffic of any size must pass through the Cumbraes Gap between the Great Cumbrae island and Bute, a distance of some 20 miles or so down river from the exit to the Gareloch and opposite the Ayrshire town of Largs. If this gap were mined, it effectively bottles up all shipping up-river of this neck of water and if a ship sank here it would effectively block the channel to all but small ships such as MCMVs. However, the passage of most surface ships and submarines would be near impossible. Whilst disruption of commercial shipping from mining would not be a major problem, the effect on naval movements would be significant especially on the effective operation of what is now the United Kingdom’s premier submarine base.
The question is, does the UK have sufficient MCM assets to keep these facilities open, especially if attacks had to be countered at multiple locations? Given the limited resources available this is doubtful and currently, although the subject has been raised in Parliament, little is being done to redress the situation.
7.2 JOINT OPERATIONS - THE FALKLANDS
BACKGROUND
As readers will know already, a short war [Operation Corporate] took place between April and mid-June 1982 the aim of which was to remove Argentine invaders and return the islands to British rule. This involved mustering a task force in the shortest possible time, and sailing it initially to Ascension Island, whilst efforts were made to resolve the situation by diplomatic means. The Prime Minister of the day, having decided that these efforts were doomed to failure, then ordered the consolidated force to proceed south and re-take the islands. It is not the purpose of this paper to go over these well documented events but it is worth noting the following:
Composition of the main task force in 1982:
Royal Navy, 33 surface ships - 5 nuclear attack submarines [SSN] - 1 conventional submarine [SSK] - 5 stern trawlers converted to mine sweepers [commissioned into the RN]..
Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), 22 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, including 6 Sir class Landing Ship Logistic (LSL),
Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service - 2 ships [Goosander: salvage and mooring, and Typhoon: ocean going tug].
Merchant ships [known as STUFT - Ships Taken up from Trade], - 45 ships, including QE2, Canberra, Uganda [hospital ship] and 10 oil tankers. [Some of the BP tankers carried out replenishment at sea(RAS)].
As can be seen, this was no small enterprise.
The Political History
During the 60s and 70s, various talks were held between the United Kingdom and Argentina to resolve the territorial issues, and these were normally held in secret to avoid the inevitable controversy which would ensue if the islanders got wind of them. Indeed on a number of occasions various Foreign Secretaries were required to issue statements and one, Lord Chalfont, visited the islands as a result of such a controversy becoming public knowledge. Schemes such as a condominium arrangement between the UK and Argentina, and a transfer of sovereignty and lease back for 99 years [as in Hong Kong] were firmly rejected by the Islanders. In 1977, a mini task force, which included a nuclear submarine, was dispatched to the South Atlantic and later recalled, but by 1981, with defence cuts looming and the announcement that HMS Endurance would be withdrawn the junta in power in Buenos Aires perceived a lack of interest in the fate of the Falklands, which triggered the south Georgia incident and the subsequent invasion of the East Island via Stanley.
The current position [2009] is that the Prime Minister has reiterated the United Kingdom position [That there is nothing to discuss on the sovereignty issue] in response to the Argentine President’s re-assertion of her county’s claim to the Archipelago and its dependent territories]. There is also a pending dispute on continental shelf and sea bed issues under UNCLOS 1982 [the convention on the Law of the Sea] and its subsequent additions and amendments, which will probably go to arbitration. Diplomatically, there exists an impasse, particularly when the views of the Islanders, most of whom are of British descent[1], are taken into consideration. Having spent four years in the Falklands, the author believes that no Islanders will willing give up their present citizenship, and will never consider Argentinean[2] citizenship.
DEFENCE OF THE ISLANDS
The question now posed is simply “could the islands now be defended if the need arose?” It is arguable that at the crux to this is the existence of Royal Air Force Mount Pleasant airbase (MPA), which was built to enable the rapid reinforcement of the Falklands, should the need arise. The complex consists of the airfield itself, dispersed hangars, accommodation etc, plus a deep water jetty and small port facility at Mare Harbour on East Cove which is connected by a feeder road to the main establishment. At present the small military presence [circa 500 personnel] includes a Royal Artillery detachment to man the Rapier air defence battery and HMS Clyde [a new OPV with the facility to land on a Sea King or Merlin helicopter] is the only permanent naval presence. The Atlantic South frigate or destroyer [when available] spends some time in the area, and normally visits South Georgia during the deployment. It is understood that there are 4 Tornado aircraft, a VC-10 tanker and a C 130 normally resident, plus 2 Sea Kings [RAF] and 2 civilian helicopters on charter to the MoD.
Effective defence would therefore depend, to a large extent, on the ability of the UK home base to reinforce the island’s small garrison in an emergency. This in turn is dependent upon the known level of threat; whether there were prior indications of this[3], or whether the attack was a complete surprise, achieved without warning.
POSSIBLE THREAT
There are two factors to be considered here, these being the sovereignty issue which must take into consideration Argentine political will to embark on another invasion, and the material state of the Argentine armed forces. Recent assessments point to these armed forces being much less respected and capable than was the case 25 years ago, and a suggestion that they are no longer a budget priority within the state apparatus. However, these relative weaknesses should not be read as the Argentinean State giving up its claim to the islands, as this is far from the case. Whilst it is accepted that the air force [by far and away the most aggressive and professional entity in 1982] is smaller and probably less effective, and the navy no longer has a carrier[4] in its inventory, nonetheless, in 1982 Argentinean air operations against British forces were launched from the mainland. Additionally, Argentinean warships are still very capable having made out of area deployments to the Persian Gulf in recent years, and the country still has one Type 209[5] and two TR-1700 conventional submarines of German origin, which, although over twenty years old, are still effective units that could cause havoc if operated effectively in the South Atlantic.
There is of course the “What if” factor to be considered. Even if the Argentinean economy is in a parlous state, there are a number of trouble makers in South America, one of whom, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, has access to plenty of cash, and could be supportive if he had a mind to, and who, no doubt, would be delighted to have an opportunity to assist in giving the British a bloody nose. Probably a pertinent consideration here would be the United Kingdom’s perceived military weakness, which is regularly exposed by events in the media for all to see.
Distance plays a significant part too. The Falklands are over 7,000 air miles from the United Kingdom, but only 300 to 500 sea miles, depending on departure location, from Argentina. A determined covert attack on MPA could therefore be mounted in a short space of time from the mainland if the air assets and troops required could be mustered and organised. Whether this could be mounted by Argentina, without secondary help is open to conjecture, but must be considered as a possibility, and whether the force available in the islands could repel such an attack - especially a surprise raid - is also a matter for debate. If a threat was assessed to exist, or be in the making, it must be assessed by others more familiar than the author with the current state of operational readiness within the Royal Air Force to make a judgement on the ability to reinforce the islands quickly, bearing in mind the need for air-tankers, the positioning of same for in-flight refuelling via Ascension Island, the distances, and the endurance of the chosen aircraft etc.
[To take but one possible example: A swift combined air landed reinforcement option by the RAF and Parachute Regiment. This would require a massive effort in planning and air transport resources at a time when the same assets are already stretched supporting operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. To transit 7000 miles (including a refuelling stop in Ascension Island) and drop or air land (if in a benign environment) one battalion sized battle group would require the complete fleet of RAF C17 Globemasters, accompanied by most (if not all) of the RAF’s air refuelling assets, along with C130J logistic support and fighter protection. At a push this might be accomplished, but at what cost to all other ongoing operations and, without support, this lightly armed force, now very much out on a limb, would surely need the reassurance that sea mounted reinforcement and logistic support was on its way?]
Should the islands find themselves in a position where, as in 1982, an invading force was already ashore, offering resistance to any reinforcement option, a number of alternative options might be required. Special forces might be deployed by submarine [an SSN should be able to cover around 600 nautical miles per day submerged]. However readers have to bear in mind that at present the RN has only 8 submarines [one in long refit, and probably one in maintenance] in the fleet capable of undertakin this role. Therefore, if a task force had to be assembled to day, the following factors need to be addressed.
Constraints resulting from other commitments
Although Iraq is no longer the drain on manpower it once was, the tempo of operations in Afghanistan is, and will for the foreseeable future, remain high, and the focus of UK ground forces. This campaign will continue to tie up personnel and assets, in particular infantry, logistics, RAF air transport support and helicopters from all three services.
Aircraft carriers.
Only one strike carrier is in service at any one time, currently HMS Illustrious, with HMS Ark Royal in the process of reverting back from the Air Warfare to a strike role. The ships no longer have dedicated air groups, but embark tailored air groups [TAG] made up to suit specific missions. Such a group for a South Atlantic operation might comprise 8 Ground Attack Harriers, Sea King ASaC 7s [ Airborne Surveillance and Control], and perhaps two Sea Kings or Merlins for Search and Rescue, if space could be found to accommodate them. Another constraint in these small carriers is magazine capacity needed during sustained operations. The concept of TAGs is unique to the Royal Navy, and has already been proved significantly less effective in terms of operational capability than a dedicated air group. In any case, the fleet is finding that, with so many air assets deployed to other theatres, the maintenance of a credible carrier borne aviation capability is becoming a serious and growing problem. This is the core problem. In 1982 two carriers were deployed - HMS Invincible and Bulwark - with embarked air defence FA2 Harrier jump jets. Today, only one carrier would be available with no dedicated air defence jets, having to rely upon ground attack Harriers with no air defence radars and inferior air combat weapons.
Amphibious Warfare Fleet.
Probably the only area of satisfaction within the Royal Navy at the present time is the amphibious warfare fleet. Comprising HMS Ocean [Landing Platform Helicopter] capable of carrying 12 Sea Kings, 6 Lynx and Chinooks [albeit that the latter cannot be accommodated in the hangar, and rotors have to be stowed manually]. However once embarked, the LPH can accommodate 180 Squadron personnel and up to 600 troops. In addition there are also two Landing Platform Dock [LPD] - HM Ships Albion and Bulwark] - that can embark 6 tanks or 30 armoured vehicles. The LPD can also take 4 utility landing craft, two helicopters on the flight deck, 300 troops, plus another circa 400 in overload capacity. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) operate Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary [LSDA] - RFAs Largs, Lyme, Mounts and Cardigan Bay - and these can operate utility landing craft from a dock, as well as helicopters on the flight deck. However these RFA’s are lightly armed, and relatively slow -18 knots max which puts the Falklands around 13 days steaming time away.
Escorts:
Five Type 42 Air defence destroyers, with HMS Liverpool presently in refit, 4 Type 22 frigates [1 in long term refit at Rosyth] and 13 Type 23s [ normally two in long refit at any particular time]. This would make 18 escorts in total.
Fleet Submarines [all nuclear]:
Eight submarines [normally one in long refit (presently HMS Triumph) and one in maintenance], including the sole remaining ‘S’ Boat [HMS Sceptre], due to decommission late 2010. A similar number to 1982 if the whole force is deployed.
MCMV and Off Shore Patrol Vessel (OPV)
16 MCMVs [5 normally deployed out of the UK], 3 River class OPVs [Fisheries] and HMS Clyde [Falkland Islands permanent guard ship].
Survey Ships and Ice Patrol Ship
HMS Scott [Ocean survey ship] HM Ships Echo and Enterprise: modern Oceanographic/Hydrographic survey ships, plus HMS Roebuck, a coastal survey vessel often tasked in the MCM HQ role. The Ice Patrol ship HMS Endurance is in Portsmouth for survey/repairs after a flooding incident late in 2008 at sea in the South Atlantic.
Royal Fleet Auxiliaries
The operational fleet consists of 2 Wave class fleet tankers with full air support facilities and two Leaf class tankers [no air facilities] and two small fleet tankers [Rover class][6]. All of the tankers have abeam and astern replenishment at sea [RAS] capability. In addition two Fort class supply ships, with hangar and maintenance facilities for 4 Sea Kings and two later Fort class “one stop” replenishment ships [fuel, armaments and spares] have capacity to operate 3 Merlin or 5 Sea King helicopters. One is presently in refit on the Tyne. Additionally, there is one forward repair ship. [RFA Diligence: often used to support submarines when on long term deployments away from UK] and the Aviation Training Ship - RFA Argus - [presently in refit at Falmouth] which can embark 6 Sea Kings or Merlins and carry 12 Harriers in the ferry role. She also has the facility to be used as a Primary Casualty Reception Ship.
Strategic Sealift Ro-Ro Ships.
Government owned, but not RFAs, 6 vessels which fly the red Ensign. Used to support military activities in the Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as making voyages to Norway, the Falklands etc in support of the UK military. 2 are at present chartered out to a Finnish shipping company, but can be returned in an emergency to the defence Logistics Organisation.
CONCLUSIONS
Readers can therefore draw their own conclusions as to whether the Falkland Islands could be defended, or re-taken if necessary utilising current force levels, or indeed if it would be possible in current circumstances. The author feels that statements in recent years emanating from the MoD regarding the ability of the Royal Navy to operate a Falklands style of operations to be a trifle optimistic. How nice it would be to have a real aircraft carrier [as has been taken on board by Russia, India and China, and aspired to by other emerging sea wise nations] with an embarked air group, Airborne Early Warning, etc, with the ability to carry all these assets rapidly [600 nm per day at 25 knots], the utility and versatility of these assets being proved in June 1961 [Kuwait: HMS Victorious and HMS Bulwark], January 1964 [Tanganyika: HMS Centaur] and 1977 Belize [HMS Ark Royal] to name but a few. Perhaps the current population of the islands should be encouraged to set up a branch of the UKNDA.
7.3 RAF SUPPLY SUPPORT CASE STUDY
“Logistics is the stem without which the flower of victory cannot blossom” ( Winston Spencer Churchill )
RAF SUPPLY POLICY - JUST IN TIME OR JUST TOO LATE?
INTRODUCTION
Current and recent war fighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been described as the most intensive since the Korean war, yet our armed forces are, in manpower terms, the smallest they have been since the 1930’s. Indeed, the armed forces budget as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is also the lowest it has been for decades. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall successive governments have been looking for ways to cash in on the ’Peace Dividend’ by cutting the supply support and infrastructure for the steadily reducing core establishment of the armed forces. Albeit that this problem affects all 3 services, a major loser in this drive for economy has been RAF logistic support.
This under-funding has led to an already declining air fleet to be further stretched as more and more aircraft are grounded for lack of spares and/or used as sacrificial lambs from which to harvest the parts needed to keep other aircraft airborne. In some fleets it is not uncommon to find over 30% grounded for ‘maintenance reasons‘. This has a knock on effect on the front-line, especially for the ’troops’ engaged in combat operations, as dangerous road trips must be undertaken because of a lack of RAF support helicopters and urgently required armoured vehicles are delayed from entering theatre because of limited air transport aircraft availability. This lack of helicopters and air transport is a major strategic and tactical problem for the conduct of operations in a vast land locked country such as Afghanistan.
THE CAUSE - STOCK HOLDING POLICY 1990 VERSUS TODAY
The RAF policy for stock holdings in the 1990s was based on a sophisticated combination of, amongst other criteria, collated past consumption data, the meantime between a unit failing, the re-order period with industry, war reserves and where appropriate, the time between average unit replacement. World wide visibility of requirements and consumption was maintained by the supply managers who were able to calculate stock re-orders in advance of stock exhaustion and place contracts with industry. However, perceived difficulties with this system were identified in the 1990s and much staff effort was devoted to overcoming the problems - the RAF Engineers knew only too well that the system was prone to failure and that they were forced to ’rob’ unserviceable aircraft to keep others flying.
Tellingly, the reasons for these supply failures were not always system driven but often the result of financial restrictions dictated by an ever tightening defence budget. Manipulation of the procurement parameters, through HM Treasury driven initiatives, designed to save money, caused stock deficiencies in the system but were accepted as a calculated risk factor. At the same time, the MOD, in an effort to save money to pay for Front Line operations, was reviewing the reserve and stock holding policy, leading to a reduction of unit and depot shelf stock. The corollary was a marked reduction in the safety net previously provided by a once functional, if expensive, stock holding policy.
To replace the system previously employed, the new policy was based upon a ‘pact’ with industry as outlined in one of many Government instigated consultancy papers. In effect, what the consultants offered, was a system based on minimal holdings supported by a dynamic supply chain reaching from ‘factory to fox hole‘ via ‘coupling bridges‘. This was consultants jargon which basically proposed a system labelled ‘Just In Time Logistics’ designed to place ever greater reliance on the manufacturers and repair bases to push supplies up the logistic pipe line as and when required, reducing the pool of RAF stock reserves.
THE PROBLEMS & CONSEQUENCES
Deficiencies in this new ‘Just in Time’ philosophy were evident to any independent observer even before the system was implemented. For this system to succeed, it required an integrated delivery plan, very tight liaison with industry and, most important of all, a commercial sector that could deliver on time, every time. However, MOD, through its past dealings with industry knew that delivery promises were often illusory, and that when confronted by another client competing for the same items or resources, the commercial inclination was to support the non-MOD client first. It was also well understood that small quantity contracts invited extra costs and increased deliver times because the company would be unable to benefit from economies of scale. In other words, the MOD might believe that they were making savings by reducing stock holdings and in transferring storage costs to industry but there is no such thing as a free lunch and the suppliers would simply add these overheads to the price. In the long term, this would add to defence costs and drive the vicious circle of ever decreasing spares availability.
(According to the Centre for Defence Economics at the University of York , defence inflation is currently running at between 6 to 8% and domestic inflation at 0.5% to 3%. Therefore the defence procurement budget requirement doubles every 7 to 8 years).
Hence, the negative effects from this policy shift have been felt not only on deployed operations but throughout the whole RAF supply system and are well documented in the British media - Troops stranded in-theatre unable to start their well earned leave; urgently required vehicles delayed in Dubai and Gloucestershire because airlift is not available; men dying in minefields or on the roads of Afghanistan through lack of helicopters; parachute training years behind schedule and exercises being cancelled, to name but a few examples.
With stockholdings reduced to the bare minimum, any unforeseen increase in consumption, not replaced by industry, inevitably leads to aircraft being grounded in the operational area unless other aircraft are ’robbed’ to fill the supply shortfall. It is axiomatic to say that the further an operation is from its home base the more vulnerable it is to logistic failure but, under the new ’Just in Time’ policy, the number of days of spares held for operations was reduced to 7 on the understanding that the logistic pipe line would be able to take up this slack. However, this does not always happen and the ‘robbing’ of non-deployed aircraft restricts the home base in its ability to carry out essential training and replacement activities.
We see the effects today with support helicopter and transport aircraft shortages in operational theatres and the time bomb of increased flying hours for all remaining RAF operational aircraft. Indeed, MOD spokesmen are often quoted as telling us that up to 33% of any aircraft fleet is, by necessity, unavailable for operations due to servicing requirements. These latter effects lead to, at best, reduced fleet availability and at worst, the possibility of catastrophic aircraft structural failure - a sad reality when the RAF lost a Nimrod over Afghanistan and a dozen brave men with it.
When industry is unable to meet the requirement to prime the logistic pipeline, because of competition for resources or Government under-funding, support to the front line suffers and by definition the home base becomes moribund. In these circumstances ‘Just In Time’ may be ’Just Too Late’. Saving money in the long term must be measured against the extra expense and inefficiency incurred in the short term in overcoming logistic shortfalls in support for the front line. This environment of continual budget decline vis-à-vis GDP, made worse by high defence procurement inflation, leads to a steady degradation in RAF operational support and ultimately an already ageing and declining aircraft fleet must be reduced still further through ’robbing’ and attrition.
It was recognised in the late 1990s that shortages would accrue from the ’Just In Time’ philosophy and that robbing Peter to pay Paul would continue to be used to overcome short-term deficiencies. However, back then and following ’Options for Change’, the assumption was that only one major operation would be carried out at a time, with a recuperation period built in before any new deployment. Bosnia, Afghanistan and Kosovo were ongoing operations prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and there was no recuperation period for the forces, in any theatre, despite these overlapping commitments. This is a Government induced foreign policy that breaches the fundamental assumptions upon which the Armed Forces are funded.
As a consequence, major procurement programmes are suffering reductions, deferral or cancellation and a flawed and under-funded supply system is creaking under the pressure. All of which leads to severe strain on an already overstretched defence budget, a situation which can only be corrected by this Government providing a substantial cash injection.
However, instead of finding a solution to this self induced, under funding problem, in 2004 our Government cut the defence helicopter budget by £1.4bn, and in 2008, the whole defence budget was reduced by £2bn - the first department of state to have to find such savings. More savings (cuts) are in the pipeline. This, despite Defence only receiving a real increase in funding of around 10% over the past decade whilst all other departments (except the foreign office) received upwards of 40% and some (Education and Health) well over 100%.
7. 4 ARMY CASE STUDY - COL BOB STEWART
The following ARMY Case Study has been reproduced and updated with the kind permission of the author, Col Bob Stewart, from an earlier UKNDA major defence paper – 'A Compelling Necessity'. Col Stewart explains the strain that current war fighting in Afghanistan is having upon the British Army in general and the infantry in particular, highlighting some of the downstream problems that occur because of under funding leading to a lack of manpower. This in turn leads to a mismatch in tasking against available manpower which is most pronounced in the areas of lack of rest and recuperation and mounting casualties, possibly leading to the psychological effects of Combat Stress and, longer term, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This is what he says:
There are nearly 9,500 soldiers currently on operations in Afghanistan and another 9,000+ are preparing to go there with a further 9,000+ recovering from recent tours. That means that about 28% of our trained soldiers are directly involved in the campaign there at any one time and this is a huge burden on the Army – particularly for some specialised troops.
Tour intervals, the time between returning from operations and then deploying again, are supposed to be 2 years. This Army Board target, to allow for leave, recovery and training, is unachievable for most soldiers – especially engineers, signallers, medics, intelligence personnel and, of course, infantrymen. During a recent operation more than 50% of the Army’s signallers were deployed, and worse still, could not even be replaced one for one. Hence, individual tour intervals are thus often measured in months not years and sometimes, for specific specialisations, only weeks!
This problem is exacerbated by under-strength units who require to ‘borrow’ bayonet strength from other units, who in their turn are further depleted in numbers and individual tour interval times. Therefore, some soldiers are turned around on operations within a month or two and this massive pressure must in turn increase the chances of long-term psychological damage to our soldiers.
The Government deserves credit for now providing better care for the wounded although the provision for visiting families still needs improvement. Soldiers, like all servicemen, much prefer to be in separate wards looked after by Service medical staff, an entirely reasonable requirement but it seems as though there is little chance we will again have the ideal scenario – dedicated service hospitals.
The historical combat ratio of one dead to three wounded - as a rule - is no longer extant. Now, thanks largely to improved battlefield medical care, particularly at the point of wounding, the ratio is considerably better looking more like one dead to five wounded. But greater survivability produces even more requirement for dedicated medical facilities.
The Government also deserves credit for now supplying better equipment in some areas. Despite a continuing and serious lack of battlefield helicopters, effective operational radios, and mine-proof land vehicles, the long-running problems of top quality weapons and other operational equipment have now largely been fixed, albeit that the MoD is having to do the best it can with a seriously inadequate budget. However, uncompetitive low pay, particularly in the junior ranks, and far too little time for rest, recuperation and retraining between gruelling battlefield tours, has caused a marked decline in general morale to the extent of creating an imminent flood of crippling resignations. Battlefield morale, however, presently remains high as it does in the other two Services, but it cannot continue to remain high indefinitely unless funding is much improved.
The Army, like the Navy and Air Force, is seriously under-resourced. There is a huge mismatch between what it is asked to do and what can be done properly. Therefore, the means must match the needs far better as operational commitments are unlikely to lessen, indeed, in the medium and certainly the longer-term they are more likely to increase as the world becomes a more hostile and unpredictable place.
Publicly, General Sir Richard Dannatt, as Chief of the General Staff, has expressed the belief that he really needs another 3,000 infantry soldiers (about 6 extra infantry battalions) to carry out current operational commitments. The infantry is currently about 28,000 strong – out of an Army establishment of around 100,000 trained soldiers. That would imply the Army would need to expand by about 10,500 trained soldiers to be adequately staffed for Afghanistan (IE to a strength of around 111,000).
However, this notional increase in manpower, even if it were to happen, is simply to deal with current tasking and will not overcome the basic underlying problem - there is no spare capacity (no reserve) here for the unexpected.
8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper has been a collaborative effort by several non-executive members of the UK National Defence Association (UKNDA) who feel strongly that the case for better funded armed forces is not being made adequately by the opposition parties, and neglected by the current Government. We are indebted to Col Bob Stewart, Lt Col Malcolm Lindley, Lt Cdr David Graham RN (Rtd) and Sqn Ldr Dave Tisdale RAF (Rtd) who contributed directly and to the authors of past UKNDA papers - ‘Overcoming the Defence Crisis’, ‘A Decision the Next Prime Minister Must Make’ and ‘A Compelling Necessity’ - all of which provided inspiration and valuable background.
In particular, we have drawn upon National Audit Office and Defence Analytical Service Agency published sources for statistical data and published reports. The Centre for Defence Economics, York University provided excellent background in the area of defence procurement policy and funding, and Kings College London provided detail in respect of medical issues - most especially studies into casualty rates, Combat Stress and PTSD. In addition, personal contact with, and published material from, service charities such as the Royal British Legion and Combat Stress proved invaluable.
Finally, and not always acknowledged, we would like to pay tribute to the British media - Broadcast and Print - who keep the subject alive in the minds of the British public. Not least alone in supporting the cause of individual servicemen and women, who do their duty but are all too often forgotten or just seen as pawns in the wider defence debate.
[1] There were circa 1800 Falkland Islanders at the end of the 1982 conflict. Since then, there have been additional immigrants from the
[2] A suggestion was made by
[3] Reports from the captain of HMS Endurance about abnormal movements etc at Ushuaia where the ship spent Christmas 1981 were ignored by the MoD.
[4] The carrier was discarded in 2000 without replacement.
[5] It is not known if this vessel, ARA Salta, is still operational.
[6] It is worth noting that the 1982 force had, in addition to the RFA, 10 STUFT tankers taken up from trade as additional support.
Our Armed Forces - broke in all but name?
The UK spends over £30 billion per year on defence, the second largest amount in the world. But as Gwyn Prins and Lord Salisbury argued in 'Risk, Threat and Security in the United Kingdom’, the armed forces suffer from overstretch and under-manning. Is it the Northern Rock of government funding – broke in all but name? The death of a Scottish reservist, to which I shall return later, provides a tragic vignette of the funding crisis gripping the armed forces.
The crisis is traceable back to the 1997 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). It set out the future composition of the armed forces in the face of expected threats and challenges. The budget funds two key elements of the UK armed forces, personnel and equipment, both vital to the composition of the armed forces and ultimately the security of the UK. Large equipment procurement projects, and defence inflation put the defence budget under pressure. There are a host of equipment projects (either recently completed or due for completion soon), each of which has cost or is due to cost many millions if not billions of pounds. These projects claim a substantial part of the defence budget, but the impact of their initial cost is exacerbated by an escalation in costs of around 10 per cent a year. Defence inflation is inescapable; equipment is expensive and doubles in price every seven and a quarter years, according to defence economist Keith Hartley. The military’s finest asset is its personnel, but a volunteer army is not cheap. If suitable terms are not offered, recruits will not join and trained personnel will leave. This is happening today. Recruitment and retention requires appropriate funding. Yet government spends less on defence than in 1997, in real terms. As defence inflation afflicts high-profile equipment projects, government resorts to penny-pinching on the humdrum but essential items such as accommodation, basic kit, training and rehabilitation facilities for the gravely wounded.
In order to alleviate the pressure on the defence budget caused by equipment inflation and overrun, the personnel budget is compromised. Thus, personnel bear the brunt, committed to operational duties with too few individuals; a shortage of units, causing disaffection, low morale and ultimately retention problems. The adverse effect on recruitment and retention is clear when, in April last year, the Army was short by 2,520 persons, the Navy by 1,860, and the RAF by 1,460 (figures given by Liam Fox in the House of Commons). The MoD’s own study, carried out in 2005, revealed that a quarter of the armed forces wished to leave at the earliest opportunity. The TA is in no better position. The MP for Aldershot Gerald Howarth said in the House of Commons in March 2006 that the number of TA personnel stood at 31,680, a shortfall in its establishment of around 6,500. He went on to argue ‘that only a third of the TA is ready for operations’ and that 13,500 men and women have left the TA since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, with 500 leaving a month in 2006. The TA's manning levels are now at some of the lowest in history, yet deployments are the highest in recent memory.
Howarth’s comments about TA shortfall highlight the relatively unpublicised death of a young soldier deployed to Iraq in 2003. Armed forces under-funding impacted upon Private Jason Smith, who had served with the TA since 1992. He reported for duty on the 30 May 2003 to be deployed to Iraq with C Company, 52nd Lowland Regiment. He had ten days of acclimatisation in Kuwait, rather than the recommended fourteen. By the early part of August 2003, he was struggling in the searing heat. During the daytime, temperatures reached 50°C and, at night, dropped to between 30-35°C. On 13 August 2003, he died of heat stroke in his base at Al-Amarah Stadium. The army board of inquiry into his death noted that ‘the level of manpower within C Company was inadequate for the task in hand and prevented the soldiers from getting effective rest’. The board of inquiry notes that at the time of Smith’s death, C Company was working at a high tempo, patrolling and guarding a power station and in the days preceding his death, it had come under mortar attack and been involved in a riot. Witnesses state that there was insufficient manpower for the tasks they were asked to undertake.
The high tempo of operations was compounded by C Company’s inadequate accommodation. They were living in a concrete office block: without windows, doors, breeze or air conditioning, there was no respite from the scorching temperatures. The manner in which Smith lost his life is a tragic snapshot of the crisis. He was a reservist serving in an undermanned company in an undermanned Territorial Army. He was four days short of the recommended time he should have been allowed to acclimatise before being deployed. When in theatre, supply problems meant that the day-to-day soldiering difficulties were compounded by the lack of air conditioning at their base. It is sadly too late for Private Smith, but the men and women of the armed forces deserve better. They are being let down. The operational commitments which they are asked to perform show no sign of receding.
The legacy of Iraq means that there are currently around 4,500 UK personnel deployed in Basra. The mission in Afghanistan is set to loom large for a number of years to come, which will require nearly 8,000 British troops by 2009. Added to the intense operational duties in Iraq and Afghanistan, are the security duties the UK armed forces still have to perform at home. They are deployed in large numbers in Germany and have defence and peacekeeping duties in Bosnia, Kosovo, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, and the Falkland Islands. There are only so many places one can send a finite number of troops without stretching them to breaking point. One defence expert quoted by the BBC estimates that another £10 billion is needed for this year, if the current procurement programmes are to be maintained alongside operational commitments.
It is high time that the government ordered a fresh review of defence policy. It must contemplates the long-term role of the armed forces and takes a long, hard look at the relationship between the UK, the USA and the burden of NATO commitments. If the UK is to remain a faithful American ally and a senior NATO player, the government will have to spend more to maintain this role. The one statistic which counts most is annual defence spending per capita. The UK spends $990 per capita, whilst the USA (also involved in Iraq and Afghanistan) spends nearly double at $1,759 (SIPRI figures). The UK lags way behind its major ally in terms of defence spending. In the short term, this year’s allocation of £33.4 billion for defence spending is simply not enough. The funding crisis can only be solved by politicians with the strength of character to argue and persuade the British people Parliament that increasing defence spending is worth it for the safety and security of the nation. The politicians will have to convince the citizens of this country they will have to pay substantially more per capita for their defence and security if they are to have essential and state-of-the-art equipment and one of, if not the best, volunteer armed forces in the world.
Should the UK mission in Afghanistan fail then the prospects are bleak. Afghanistan will return to civil war; the Taliban will re-emerge and once again, a safe haven and training camp for Al-Qa’ida will exist. It is vital that the political argument is put to the British people and defence spending is drastically increased. Otherwise, the alternative is, as Sir Mike Jackson said, ‘to pull the duvet up over our heads and hope the bogeyman goes away’.
Let us hope that the finest asset this country possesses – its armed forces – do not break in the meantime.
Former reservist in the Parachute Regiment and UKNDA Board Member
Iraq and the Military Covenant
Bishop of the Forces
MEDICAL MERCENARIES -
MEDICAL MERCENARIES FOR MILITARY MEDICINE
I read this week that the Ministry of Defence is so short of doctors and nurses that it is using a private company Frontier Medical, to supply a neurosurgeon and intensive care nurses to work in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Now I know that the Defence Medical Services have always been short of doctors and have difficulty retaining those that they have got, but to send civilians into a war zone is something we have not had to do since the Second World War. I am reliably informed that they only work within the base camps, but I am equally aware that these have been subject to mortar attack. Are we now stretched so thin that we have to ask untrained civilians to risk their lives to give our armed forces the best possible chance of survival if they are injured?
The Defence Medical Services do a magnificent job. All three services contribute to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, many Naval Medics are now preparing for their third operational tour in 5 years and in support of Land Operations. They could earn much more money in the NHS and spend the evenings at home with their families. Many lives have been saved by the dedicated work of Military Doctors, Nurses and support staff. Mr Browne now tells us that they will have to continue to do so for a further 10 years!
Somehow the Ministry of Defence has to reduce the stress of continuing operational deployments on its medics or they will all resign, safe in the knowledge that the NHS will be able to use their skills. I do understand why they spend £M4 on civilian locums, but it must be better to use fully trained military medical personnel who have been trained to look after themselves in a hostile environment. Perhaps the time has come to pay a retention bonus as has been used for pilots? An alternative might be an operational pay package, especially for repeated tours so that our service personnel at least return a little better off for their efforts on our behalf.
The bottom line has to be that more money needs to be spent on Defence. That should lead to better recruiting and retention thereby making the pool of deployable personnel bigger. The MOD sets guidelines for frequency of operational tours but for medics they are breaking them.
Other Papers for you to download
John Marshall's "Strawman " paper
What Future for the Defence Medical Services