STATE & NEEDS OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE
Air superiority is pivotal in modern conflict. It is essential for rapid transport, for vital information gathering, and for precision air attack. It improves effectiveness, cuts cost and reduces casualties. With air superiority everything is possible; without it all operations are rendered difficult if not impossible.
Over-extension
Today, 26% of the RAF’s assets and some 3,000 servicemen and women are continuously away on deployed operations. Most of the remaining assets and personnel are either being made ready for deployment or are engaged in direct support activities. In addition to the training task, significant elements are also fully engaged in UK-based or overseas permanent commitments.
This intense tempo of operational activity has been a feature of RAF life, on a continuous basis, since the Gulf War of 1991. But in 1991 we had sufficient aircraft and manpower to sustain operations; this is no longer the case. Reduction followed by reduction has shrunk the RAF from 93,000 personnel to below 41,000, while the scale and intensity of operations has increased and increased
THE SHRINKING RAF 1987 and 2007
One in ten has been deployed for more than the Ministry’s own guideline, and 24 trades – the “pinch points” – are seriously undermanned. As the MoD acknowledges: “continuing high operational tempo has also meant that the Army and the RAF did not meet individual or unit harmony guidelines.”
Spreading the resources so thinly has had inevitable costs: in the scope of operations we can undertake; in our readiness for a wider war; and in the morale of those asked to do ever more and more. Long absences impact on retention, and up to half the Service has actively considered early resignation. This will lead to a serious dilution of operational experience and difficulties in adequately manning the front line unless corrective action is taken.
The MoD recognises and acknowledges these failures, but at present it is powerless to address them, except by robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Investment
Lack of proper investment has resulted in short-term palliatives. Increasing use of Urgent Operational Requirements highlights the fact that the forces were not properly provided for in the first place. The cardinal issue is a shortage of money. The MoD is already committed to:
- Replacement of the nuclear deterrent.
- The Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) that will form the backbone of the Army’s armoured vehicle requirements.
- Two aircraft carriers, with a £3.9bn line entry for the ships.
Implications
Paying for these commitments will involve cutbacks elsewhere, in slower procurement and reduced operational capability. Under threat are two vital elements: RN surface escorts and combat air platforms. It is likely that the RAF will have to reduce the fast-jet front line still further, slicing away some of the Tranche 3 Typhoons and trading off capability with the Carriers’ Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which is as yet unfunded. JSF will be a vital “first day of war” vehicle, bringing the RAF and RN into the stealth era for the first time: not to be ignored given the new-generation Russian and Chinese air defence missiles in the pipeline. This is essential since the Russian Air Force is resurgent, the Chinese Air Force is re-equipping, and Iran is modernizing. Russian aircraft are back in the Atlantic and seeking bases in Cuba; China is exporting aircraft to Africa and has aspirations in the South China Sea, and Iran shows no let-up in its nuclear aspirations. All this while Britain is already over-committed yet still downsizing.
Solutions
We must act now. Capabilities must be restored and force levels procured to meet all our strategic goals. Manning must be improved to provide the numbers required to meet not only current commitments but also all our longer term Defence objectives.