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PIRACY: A SPREADING PROBLEM

  

Piracy in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden has now, with the seizure of the VLCC Star Sirius some 450nm off the coast of Kenya become a serious international problem, which must be addressed by maritime nations now, and not at some time in the future.

 

Firstly, it should be clearly understood that piracy is not tolerated under international maritime law. Article 88 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS 1982] makes it clear that the high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes only, and that in itself precludes pirate acts by ships or aircraft. The Convention, which was many years in the making, opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982, and entered into force 12 months after the 60^th instrument of ratification by Guyana on 16 November 1994. It is recognised as the definitive instrument governing international maritime law, and it should be borne in mind that Somalia has both signed and ratified the Convention. The United States is arguably the most important nation to have signed, but not ratified the Convention, this being continually blocked by a caucus of senators who do not believe signing is in the interests of America. The author mentions this, as it might have implications with regard to any NATO led activity in the region under discussion.  

 

Before discussing piracy in the region in more detail, it is perhaps relevant to examine what is defined in UNCLOS with regard to the territorial sea, and the Articles which specifically deal with piracy upon the high seas. To ensure accuracy, these articles are reproduced verbatim from the Convention[1].

 

The substance that is important to this paper is contained below.

 

PART II

 

TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE

 

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

 

Article 2

Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space

over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil

 

1.             The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as territorial sea.

2.             This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.

3.             The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law.

 

SECTION 2. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA

 

Article 3

Breadth of the territorial sea

 

 

Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.

 

 

Article 4

Outer limit of the territorial sea

 

The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea.

 

In addition to the territorial sea, coastal States are allowed to designate a further 12 mile belt out to 24 nautical miles from the baselines, known as the Contiguous Zone, in which certain, fiscal, sanitary and customs rules apply, but this does not constitute an extension of the territorial sea. This is important, as hot pursuit must end at the outer limit of the territorial sea, although, by prior arrangement with the State involved, hot pursuit may, in some circumstances, be allowed into the 12 mile limit,[2] usually in fishing disputes.

 

The articles specific to piracy are those shown in the following section.  

Article 100

Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy

 

All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.

 

Article 101

Definition of piracy

 

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

 

(a)  any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

                (i)  on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such a

                    ship or aircraft;

                (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).

 

Article 102

Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied

 

The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft.

 

Article 103

Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft

 

A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.

 

Article 104

Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or aircraft

 

A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.

 

Article 105

Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft

 

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

 

Article 106

Liability for seizure without adequate grounds

 

Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been affected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State, the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

 

Article 107

Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy

 

A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorised to that effect.

 

 From the above articles, it can clearly be recognised that piracy is condemned by, and forbidden under international law. There are clearly problems associated with piracy being conducted out of a failed state such as Somalia; where there is no rule of law, as is the case in the Puntland region of Somalia, and where the entire country is teetering on the brink of anarchy. Therefore, is there a case to be put forward by the affected maritime nations through the Security Council for the United Nations to look at the suspension of the rules governing hot pursuit, and also at the integrity of the territorial sea of Somalia when dealing with piracy? Also, if the inshore fishing boats and other small craft are supported by larger vessels such as stern trawlers [as was the case in the Indian frigate incident], these need to be positively identified as supporting piracy for action to be taken. These vessels have the capability of operating for long period hundreds of miles offshore, and can support many small boats. The author has known former longliners [circa 65-80m loa] to support up to one hundred line fishing canoes in West Africa at distances of 100-150 nautical miles offshore, and there is absolutely no constraints which would prevent a stern trawler acting as a mother ship to pirate raiding craft. International law allows for small fishing vessels supported by a mother ship to be considered as part and parcel of the parent’s operation in the case of fishing offences, and the author sees no reason why this should not be applied to the support of pirate operated small craft. A glance at the map below clearly illustrates the extent of the problem because of the length of the Somalian coast.   

 

It is conceivable that tanker traffic might have to stand off by as much as a thousand miles offshore, bearing in mind that Star Sirius was boarded at circa 450 nautical miles of the Kenyan Coast. Whilst this routing would probably ensure safety, it will add considerably to a tanker voyage from say Ras Tanura to Rotterdam. Yemen has been mentioned as well in the equation for good reason. The oil resources, which are in anycase relatively small, are running down, although there are significant gas reserves on shore and a Franco/Yemeni joint venture is establishing an LNG terminal at Bir Ali on the Indian Ocean coast approximately [see map] 60km southwest of Al Mukalla. The Republic of Yemen [RoY] is in fact a forced merger between North Yemen and the former socialist republic in the south, and came about on conclusion of the ending of a bitter civil war in 1994. Resentment continues to simmer in the south, as the north effectively “won” and took over land, business and property in the south. It should be remembered that the Bin Laden family are in fact from Hadramaut region and are, like many wealthy Yemenis, resident in Saudi and that there is considerable support for Al Qaeda in the Mareb region south east of the capital, Sana’a. There is also a bitter, little known war in the mountainous border region with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia KSA] close to the Red Sea coast which is being funded by Iran with the aim of overthrowing the legitimate government. This to the chagrin of the southerners, is being fought in the main by young soldiers recruited from the south of the country. All of these factors, coupled with the tribal loyalties [similar to the clan loyalties in Somalia] and a lack of proper funding to pay public service employees could result in the failure of Yemen as a functioning state, and is reason enough for the West to continue to direct aid and technical assistance to the RoY. At the moment, there are many safe anchorages on the coast from which illegal fishing is conducted under the patronage of persons in important positions, and these safe havens could equally be used by pirates. Both the Yemen Navy and the Yemen Coast Guard Authority [YCGA] are, for a variety of reasons, more or less powerless to prevent the illegal actions from occurring.

 

It should be noted that the RoY claim under UNCLOS is a 12 nm territorial sea and a 200 nm EEZ, although the 24 nm contiguous zone appears in various acts etc.

 

WAY FORWARD.

 

It is hoped that the foregoing will have thrown some light on the scope, both present and potential, of the problem and the importance of addressing it in a meaningful fashion. Placing armed security guards on merchant ships is frankly unlikely to deter these people, who are becoming better organised as time goes by. RPGs, automatic weapons, small arms etc abound throughout the region, for example a good quality AK-47 can be bought for $120 in any gun shop in Sana’a. The writer therefore cannot see the effectiveness of on-board personnel unless they are highly trained, perhaps former special forces or other elite troops. If piracy and pirates are to be treated with kid gloves, might the question “what are navies for?” quite rightly be asked by commercial shipping interests?

Apparently, the current NATO mandate is to protect WFP shipping delivering aid, and to respond to calls for assistance from other vessels which believe they are under attack. Surely the Rules of Engagement for any warships should be such as to prevent, rather than respond to an attack, as once the pirates are on board, the risk to the merchant vessel’s crew is such that removing them would be difficult and dangerous. Pirates on board the trawler sunk by INS Tabar reportedly threatened to attack and blow up the warship. It is now being claimed that this vessel was simply a Thai fishing support ship in pirate hands. Fine, but readers may have seen the pictures of the event after the frigate opened fire. The resulting catastrophic explosion was similar to that which broke the back of HMS Antelope in San Carlos water. The writer has boarded many stern freezers and fishing support ships which carry spare warps, gear, doors, lub oil, cartons etc, but never anything which would explode with the ferocity surrounding the demise of this ship. Fortunately the C.O. of the Indian frigate took no chances when fired upon, perhaps remembering what happened to USS Cole when she was attacked in Aden harbour in 2000. This incident therefore illustrates the danger to boarding parties and the need to prevent seizure, rather than react to it after the event.          

 

It is now becoming clear that the only way of tackling this problem is by international naval co-operation in convoying ships from off the Oman coast through Bab el Mandeb and half way up the Red Sea if they are going to use the canal and vice versa, and by escorting those ships bound for east or southern Africa or the cape route to Europe or the States by a safe route which will require to be well offshore. This will be expensive, but so is the cost of routing all merchant shipping via the cape, paying extortionate ransoms and of allowing piracy to gain the upper hand, which it is well on the way to achieving. Continuing to ignore the problem may also make voyages in these waters untenable, because insurance may no longer be possible. Fisheries surveillance flights out of Al Ryan [near Al Mukalla] and from Socotra over a four week period in February 2007 which involved the writer revealed an average of 25-30 large merchant ships in both directions observed from the aircraft.[3] On any particular day, these would include VLCCs, Suezmax tankers, dry bulkers, container ships of all sizes, car carriers, and smaller merchant ships, as well as fishing vessels.

 

The Royal Navy would of course participate, but in its present state could not muster many midi-ships without withdrawing from other commitments in the north and south Atlantic, for example. Perhaps HM Ships Exeter, Southampton and Nottingham could be brought forward to fill the gaps, releasing more modern and capable ships for the task. Ideally, a carrier could be tasked to gather intelligence through AEW assets, and to strike at pirate vessels when they are identified, but with Illustrious effectively operating without an air group, all she could be expected to do would be to act as a platform, perhaps for American aircraft.

 

In conclusion, the problem is such, and is escalating so rapidly that maritime nations must act now to ensure that commercial shipping activity in such important sea lanes is not permanently disrupted. With firm action and sensible Rules of Engagement, this activity can still be brought to a halt, and in doing so, it should be borne in mind that piracy is, and always has been, against international maritime law.        

 

It is respectfully hoped that this article might generate food for thought.

  

DAVID C. GRAHAM

28 NOVEMBER 2008 

[1] The Convention can be downloaded from the UN web site in pdf format. Simply search for UNCLOS 1982.

[2] This has happened in cases of hot pursuit involving fishing vessels over long distances. In one case a US Coastguard cutter was allowed to follow a Taiwanese fishing vessel right into a Taiwanese port. 

[3] A BN-2T twin turbo Islander MPA with 4.5 hours actual patrol time.

 

 

Sailing for trouble - Taken from Defence Management site

www.defencemanagement.com

PARLIAMENTARY REPORT MAY/JUNE 2008 - by Christopher Cope - Political commentator for 'Warship World' (wherein this article first appeared)

Type-23 frigates

The MoD was asked to publish the hull costs (excluding government furnished equipment) for each of the original 16 Type-23 frigates at 2007 prices. These are the figures:-

1. NORFOLK £174m
2. ARGYLL £176m
3. MARLBOROUGH £175m
4. LANCASTER £171m
5. IRON DUKE £151m
6. MONMOUTH £154m
7. MONTROSE £158m
8. WESTMINSTER £151m
9. NORTHUMBERLAND £154m
10. RICHMOND £150m
11. SOMERSET £144m
12. SUTHERLAND £176m
13. GRAFTON £141m
14. KENT £128m
15. PORTLAND £109m
16. ST ALBANS £125m

Whereas one would expect that between 1990 (first of class) and 2002 (last of class), the costs of each ship would steadily increase, on the face of it, the figures appear to be extraordinary. For example, why should IRON DUKE (completed by Yarrow in 1993) have cost £20m less than LANCASTER (completed by Yarrow in 1992)? Furthermore, why should SUTHERLAND (completed by Yarrow in 1997) have cost £32m more than SOMERSET (completed by Yarrow in 1996)? And why should GRAFTON (completed by Yarrow in 1997) have cost £35m less than SUTHERLAND completed by Yarrow the same year? Even more extraordinary was the fact that KENT completed by Yarrow three years later in 2000 cost only £128m. It seems odd that PORTLAND completed the following year by Yarrow should have cost only £109m. But ST ALBANS completed the following year, also by Yarrow, cost £125m.

In all, the Type-23s, completed over a 13-year period between 1990 and 2002 cost the taxpayer between £109m (PORTLAND in 2001) and SUTHERLAND (£176m in 1997).

At the suggestion of Warship World, Mike Hancock MP requested the MoD to clarify these figures. In answer, the MoD has said that it would be necessary to investigate historic contract information that is no longer held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

It seems extraordinary that the MoD cannot explain these very obvious disparities. All 16 ships were either built by Yarrow (12 ships) or Swan Hunter (4 ships). And yet the MoD seems to believe that a third shipbuilder was involved, namely Harrow Shipbuilder Ltd! To have built any type of warship in Harrow would have been an extraordinary feat of engineering.

As ever with the MoD, the statistics must be treated with a considerable degree of scepticism. Nevertheless, on the face of it, it would appear that the 16 Type-23s cost the taxpayer an average of £152m at 2007 prices. Compare that with the latest National Audit Office report on the Type-45 destroyers, which indicates that the unit cost for the six on order is likely to be £823m. No plausible explanation has been given as to why the Type-45s are costing in excess of five times the cost of the Type-23s. On that basis, the Future Surface Combatant (to replace the Type-22 and Type-23 frigates) could cost the taxpayer £4bn each.

Personnel

To be reported in the next issue, the Commons Defence Committee is extremely concerned that recruitment to the Navy in 2006/07 only reached 94% of target. That should be compared with 103%, 99%, 98% and 100% in the previous four years.

There will be many reasons why the Navy only managed to recruit 94% of its target in 2006/07. Perhaps one of the reasons is to be found in the statistics concerning the average hours worked per week per service. The Navy topped the table at 53, with the Army in second place at 48 and the RAF at 44.

The requirement for the Royal Naval Reserve is 1784 personnel. However, trained strength is now just 1652.

In the year to 28th February 2008, the RNR suffered an outflow of 280 personnel, compared with recruiting just 140.

But on the other hand, our naval reserves see little active service. In the year to 28th February 2008, only 140 RNR and 80 RMR served in theatre.

The numbers of Sea Cadets dropped from 15,161 in 1997 to 12,438 some ten years later.

On a more positive note, the outflow in respect of Royal Marines in 2007 was 520, the lowest for ten years. This represents 8% of the total strength of 6600.

Labour MPs still seem to be obsessed with the numbers of admirals. In a recent parliamentary reply, the MoD confirmed that it had 88 surface ships and submarines, compared with 33 admirals, a ratio of 2.7 ships to admirals.

The cost of employing a single civil servant has increased from £20,000 per annum in 1997/98 to £30,000 per annum in 2006/07, a 50% increase in nine years.

Type-45 destroyers

The most recent NAO report disclosed that, with a view to saving money, £30m had been saved by reducing the number of Aster 15 and Aster 30 missiles required for the new Type-45 destroyers. The MoD has been asked to disclose how many of these missiles will not now be procured and whether any financial penalties will be incurred as a result of the order being reduced. In an unhelpful reply, the MoD said that no final decisions had been taken on the number of missiles that would be required. So how can it achieve savings by reducing numbers?

The MoD has also been asked to explain why it had been decided to reduce the number of Type-45 destroyers from 12 to 8. In its reply, the MoD cited three reasons, namely:-

1. To operate with the Cooperative Engagement Capability system which will greatly enhance a ship’s maritime air defence capability;

2. A reduction in the conventional threat; and

3. Revised concurrency assumptions, whatever that may mean.

We leave it to our readers to judge whether this explanation convincingly explains why the number of destroyers should be reduced by a third.

Bay-class Landing Ships Dock (Auxiliary)

In the next issue, we will be looking at the government’s Strategic Defence Review of 1998, ten years after it was published. In that review, the MoD said that it planned to commission a fifth Bay-class RFA. However, only four have been ordered. The MoD has been asked to explain why a fifth has not been ordered. In its reply, the MoD said that the modernisation of the amphibious fleet was completed in 2007 with the last of the four Bay-class LSD(A)s. It confirmed that it has no plans to procure a fifth vessel. Nevertheless, the reply fails to provide any strategic analysis for the reason behind the reduction in the number of Bay-class LSD(A)s by 20% since the decision was originally announced ten years ago.

Warship sales

HMS NORFOLK, MARLBOROUGH and GRAFTON were sold to the Chilean navy in 2005/06 for £134m. As mentioned above, these three ships cost the taxpayer £490m. At the date of their sale, they had been in service for an average of 13 years, about half way through their anticipated service lives.

In addition, it has been disclosed that the three Sandown-class minehunters sold to Estonia in 2006/07 produced just £32m. At the time of their construction, a Sandown-class minehunter was costing the taxpayer about £35m each.

The Falkland Islands

Continue to be a considerable drain upon the defence budget. In 2006/07, the cost of maintaining the garrison there was £65m.

Our service chiefs

In an uncompromising editorial on 11th March, the Daily Telegraph said that the cost of Britain’s military presence in Iraq had jumped by half, despite the fact that the Army was in the process of withdrawal. Overall, the cost of deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan in the year 2006/07 would be £3.3bn, double the previous year’s figure.

The editorial said that this would place immense strain on a defence budget that had remained roughly static since Labour came to power. The MoD has disclosed that by 2010/11, spending will be 11% higher in real terms than in 1997. As the Telegraph points out, this amounts to an increase of less than 1% per annum in real terms over a 13-year period. It also makes the telling point that defence inflation runs far ahead of general inflation. Having flat-lined defence spending for a decade, there are now greater demands on the military than in any comparable period since World War II. It refers to inadequate equipment and overstretched manpower.

The editorial went on to refer to the House of Lords debate in November 2007 when five former Chiefs of the Defence Staff delivered a scathing attack on the government’s entire approach to defence spending. It considered that their successors at the MoD were maintaining a rather timid tradition, namely not picking a fight whilst in office.

It says that it was not so long ago when the defence chiefs would use their prerogative to lobby the Prime Minister for increased resources. What the editorial does not mention is that the single service chiefs no longer have the right to lobby the Prime Minister directly. They must make their case to the Chief of the Defence Staff who may take up their views directly with the PM.

In conclusion, the editorial says that our stretched armed forces would find their burden easier to bear if they knew that their superiors were fighting in Whitehall as bravely as they were fighting in Helmand province.

The budget

Alistair Darling delivered his budget in March and disclosed that in 2008/09, the government would be spending £618bn. That would include some £33.6bn on defence, 5.4% of the total. In comparison, social security will absorb 24% of the budget. What that means is that for everyone in employment, one quarter of their taxes goes towards money paid to those on benefits.

Carrier escorts

In January, Nicholas Soames (Conservative) asked how many escorts the minister anticipated one of the new carriers would require, when it went to sea. In his reply, Bob Ainsworth (Minister) said that there would be sufficient escorts and that these would be in line with the defence strategy laid out to the House. How this would be achieved by maintaining a fleet of just 23 escorts (as now seems likely) was not explained.

Royal United Services Institute

Published a paper in February on Risk, threat and security – the case of the UK, prepared by Gwyn Prins, professor at the LSE, and the Marquis of Salisbury. The paper declares that the security of the UK is at risk and under threat. It referred to the intervention by the five Lords (referred to above) who in November raised their concerns about the mismatch between the country’s military commitments and the funding of its defence. The paper said that security mattered to every citizen of the UK, that it was the primary function of the state, without which there could be no state and no rule of law. The former Chiefs of the Defence Staff had stepped outside their traditional reticence to speak on behalf of all. Anxiety about defence and security ran far and wide.

The paper spoke of unchanging geo-political factors of trade, distance, trade routes and choke-points vital to the UK’s well-being. Whilst British reliance on sea traffic was increasing, our policymakers seem to suffer from “sea-blindness”. They had not noticed the weakening of the RN. The Navy was set rapidly to shrink in size and capability because of the failure to maintain construction and establishment during the last decade. The paper emphasised this point because naval force structure, once lost, was especially difficult to recover.

It noted that both India and China were matching their greater dependence upon increasing volumes of sea trade, with substantial programmes of naval construction.

The authors referred to the past problem of Russia was re-emerging. It said that Russia was ready to expropriate property, break contracts, hint at energy blackmail and pursue opponents wherever they were (the unprecedented 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia in which state resources were apparently complicit).

It referred to the failure of the Brown administration to provide significant increases of core funding for defence that had exercised Lords Brammall, Boyce, Craig, Guthrie and Inge. It said that Britain’s defence forces had been reduced during a decade of over-use, under-funding and general under-provision.

It said that defence and security must be restored as the first duty of government. The trust and mutual obligations between government, people and defence forces had to be reasserted. It wanted to take defence and security back out of the arena of short-term party politics.

In its conclusion, the paper proposed the establishment of twin committees: one a cabinet committee and the other a joint committee of the two Houses of Parliament. It believed that these committees would demonstrate to the public that the widest view of defence and security was taken within government and parliament and would show that the whole range of risks and threats was being managed.

Devonport

On 5th March, there was a brief debate in the Commons on the Devonport Naval Base, raised by Linda Gilroy (Labour/Coop MP for Plymouth Sutton). The purpose of this debate appears to have been a desire on the part of Mrs Gilroy to give the government an opportunity of saying what sterling work it was doing on behalf of the Navy and, in that regard, she was successful. I propose to make just two points with regard to Mrs Gilroy’s 15-minute speech. Firstly, although, admittedly, the Type-45 destroyers will be based at Portsmouth, she made no reference to them whatsoever, despite having contended that the country needed a strong Navy. Nevertheless, she referred to the new carriers, submarines and enhanced amphibious fleet, few of which will be based at Devonport.

Mrs Gilroy did, though, manage to attack the Opposition by saying that it seemed very preoccupied with ship numbers, rather than appreciating that what was really important was having a wide, balanced and flexible range of capabilities. She was in no way critical of the fact that the government has reduced the escort fleet from 35 to 25 surface ships in just ten years.

Military Covenant Commission

In March, David Cameron announced that he had invited the author Frederick Forsyth to lead a commission which will look at how the Military Covenant can be restored. The nation’s obligation under the Military Covenant is its loyalty to the individual manifested in justice, fair rewards and lifelong support to all who have soldiered.

The launch document says that the Military Covenant means that servicemen will always be given the best training and the best equipment that money can buy and enough of them.

The paper says that Britain’s armed forces are overstretched. Over the past decade, commitments have been increased, whilst frontline resources have been cut. It noted that exit rates for officers had increased in each of the last four years.

Members of the commission will include Rear Admiral Iain Henderson, the defence correspondent Sir John Keegan and the Falklands veteran Simon Weston. The commission will be asked to devise a policy which is both feasible and affordable to be presented to Mr Cameron and his Shadow Cabinet for consideration. The commission will be asked about the impact current government policies are having on the lives of our service personnel.

The paper makes very positive reading, until one comes to the final paragraph which says that any recommendations made by the commission must be paid for within existing and planned defence budgets.

George Osborne, the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, has already pledged that, if returned to power, the Conservatives will match Labour’s spending programme for the first three years. There is no commitment to increase defence spending.

Indeed, Mr Cameron has said that he has met and been heartily impressed by former defence chiefs who are rightly furious with the government. He has been quoted as saying:-

I don’t hear an idea that doesn’t involve me spending more money.

And yet, at the same time, Mr Cameron has made no commitment to increase defence spending beyond that already pledged by Labour.

A defence policy for the UK: matching commitments and resources

This paper was recently published by Conservative Way Forward, of whom the president is Lady Thatcher and vice-presidents include the MPs David Davis, William Hague and Dr Liam Fox, together with the peers Lords Parkinson and Tebbit. The author is Bernard Jenkin MP, a member of the Commons Defence Committee. The paper is not, as yet, official Conservative policy. This lengthy paper can be summarised as follows. It says that faced with the likelihood of global insecurity increasing over coming decades, it must be questioned whether Britain can rely on others for the maintaining of international peace and security. With regard to Europe, it says that the more our European allies talk about European defence, the less they seem prepared to spend on it.

Of the Royal Navy, the paper says that it has attempted to maintain active patrols in line with various NATO and UN commitments around the world; in the Med, the South and North Atlantic, in the Far East and in the Caribbean. Due to the mothballing and sale of ships, the Navy can no longer fulfil these commitments full time.

SDR 1998

Of the Strategic Defence Review of 1998, the paper comments that the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time has publicly acknowledged that it was seriously under-funded.

It comments that with only 8 destroyers and 17 frigates in operation, there are reports that another 6 may be mothballed. It says that the Navy believes that a combined force of 30 ships is required to counter immediate and long-term threats.

With regard to the loss of naval personnel, Vice-Admiral Sir Tim Clement has warned that, “We will not recognise that we are at the brink until it is too late and then too many will have gone”.

HMS CORNWALL

With regard to last year’s incident involving HMS CORNWALL, the paper says that the constant pressure to curtail training may not have been the cause of the capture of sailors and marines in the Gulf, but it certainly was a factor. Neither did CORNWALL have specially trained teams for shallow-water boarding, nor were the personnel captured trained for that eventuality.

It says that it is understandable that governments of both parties will continue in the hope that the UK will benefit from defence on the cheap and that the Official Opposition may not wish to make specific financial commitments (a clear dig at Mr Cameron).

With regard to European defence spending, of the ten Eurozone members of NATO, only Slovenia has increased defence spending as a proportion of GDP since 2004. In contrast, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg have decreased defence spending as a proportion of GDP, whilst Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have maintained their spending at 2004 levels. All members of the Eurozone have reduced the level of defence spending as a proportion of GDP since 1996.

Poor pay

With regard to military pay, the paper comments that this lags desperately behind other public sector workers. In 2006/07, the salary for a private in the Army was £14,323, rising to £15,677 in 2007/08. The entry salary for a police constable in 2006/07 was £21,009 rising to £23,454 on completion of training. In comparison, a trainee firefighter receives a basic salary of £20,396 rising to over £27,000 within 18 months of training. It would take a good-quality infantry recruit (or sailor) up to seven years to reach a comparable salary. The paper says that it simply cannot be right for a society to be paying our armed service personnel over a third less than those in our emergency services.

Of the RN’s procurement programme, the paper says that the Future Carrier programme, officially costed at £3.8bn, is under-funded and that an extra £500m will be required, bringing the likely total programme costs to £4.3bn.

If it wishes to maintain expeditionary capability, the paper says that the next Conservative government should commit itself to restoring the size of the Royal Navy.

Fleet submarines

With regard to the Navy’s fleet submarines, the paper says that these are vital to Britain’s sea power and quotes Lord West, “An SSN is the only guaranteed way of sinking an enemy unit and that potential frightens people”. It says that only the Americans, French, British and Russians will put to sea when they know that there is an SSN in the vicinity. To weaken this potentially devastating weapon, as the government has done since SDR (July 1998) and to prevaricate over modernising the platform, is dangerously shortsighted. It believes that eight Astutes must be ordered.

Where the paper loses some degree of credibility is with regard to its reference to the Joint Strike Fighter. It wrongly states that the RAF has ordered 150 JSF to enter service from 2012 to replace the Harrier. No such order has been placed. Furthermore, if such order is placed, this will be made by the Royal Navy for the Fleet Air Arm. However, operating the JSF will be a joint mission between the RN and RAF.

Mr Jenkin believes that the JSF is likely to be far more useful than the RAF’s Typhoon which may or may not be true. However, in comparing price, Mr Jenkin says that the estimated cost of the JSF at £25m is a great deal cheaper than Typhoon and less than half the price. However, it is quite impossible to say with any conviction at this stage that a JSF will cost the Navy only £25m per unit.

The paper refers to cancelling tranche 3 of Typhoon could achieve valuable savings, but fails to accept that, in doing so, the government may incur penal cancellation charges.

Merchant Navy

With regard to the Merchant Navy, the paper says that there is concern about the continuing ability of the MN to provide the UK with strategic lift. Since the Falklands in 1982, the number of British-owned commercial vessels exceeding 500 GT has fallen from 680 ships in 1985 to just 295 in 2007.

Mr Jenkin wants the Navy’s surface and submarine fleets to be kept up to strength. He says that the Navy is now operating east of Suez for the first time in decades and yet has undergone savage cuts, particularly among frigates and destroyers, the workhorses of the fleet.

With regard to defence spending, he says that as a proportion of GDP, spending has fallen from 2.9% in 1996 to 2.4% in 2006, whilst it has risen dramatically in both health and education. The government’s comprehensive spending review envisages that defence spending will fall to only 2% of GDP by 2011.

8% defence inflation

On defence costs inflation, Mr Jenkin puts this somewhat in excess of 8%. As a result, the government’s relatively small spending increase for the MoD means that the equipment and manpower programmes will have to be cut.

Comparing defence spending with other countries, Mr Jenkin notes that, between 1999 and 2006, spending in the USA increased by 60% in real terms, in Russia by 148%, in India by 40%, in Israel by 24%, in China by 129% and in Australia by 30%.

He says that Mr Brown has left our forces overstretched and conducting operations with insufficient capabilities. This puts at risk our ability to operate at high intensity alongside the USA.

With regard to the real-term increase of 1.5% over the next three years, Mr Jenkin says that, taking into account various factors, the actual real-term increase will be little better than nil. He believes that there will be a shortfall over the next three years of about £1bn. This will have to be recovered from a further squeeze on manpower, the mothballing of more ships and the delay or cancellation of major items in the equipment programme.

Another £15 billion

He advocates an increase in defence spending of £3bn per annum in each of the next five years. An increase of around 50% on current expenditure may seem large, but this should be compared with the increase in transport spending over the next five years. That would be less than the increases in health and education over the same period.

The last decade has seen Labour embarking on the most ambitious expeditionary foreign policy since the end of Empire without providing the armed forces with the necessary manpower, equipment and funding to do the job. The pressure on the armed forces is simply not sustainable. Mr Jenkin believes that we have two choices, namely either we bulk up our defences or opt out of our global role.