ROYAL AIR FORCE

Papers for you to download

• Concerns of a Retired Air Marshal
  
  
• Armed Forces Overstretch - A 'Crab's' Perspective
  
  
• Train Hard Fight Easy by Dave Tisdale RAF Affairs

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE OF TODAY…..AND TOMORROW?

• 26% of the Royal Air Force’s assets are currently deployed on operations, and some 3000 personnel are deployed in direct operational activity.
• Most of the rest of both assets and personnel of the RAF are in either preparation for deployment or in support activities for the deployed tasks.  Significant elements are engaged in the UK-based or overseas permanent commitments.  This tempo of operational activity has been a feature of RAF life, on a continuous basis, particularly in the Gulf, since 1991.
• MOD’s annual report notes that:
• “…to achieve operational success, the Department has had to take a level of risk against other defence objectives.  For example, despite being able to support current operational requirements, the ability of the armed forces to take on additional operations is limited.  The continuing high operational tempo has also meant that the Army and the RAF did not meet individual or unit harmony guidelines.  The Service Personnel Plan continues to make improvement in this area.” - But there is no admission of overstretch, neither financial not human.
• However this dichotomy is presented, or indeed overlooked, the key issue of context is the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) settlement, which leaves absolutely no room for manoeuvre.  Key focus points in CSR are:
• Replacement nuclear deterrent elements.
•  Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) air-portable armoured vehicles, with very high stress and priority on the utility variant against a tight timeline for in-service date (ISD).  High political weighting for the self-protection of deployed troops suggests solid ring-fencing of the cash requirement.
• Two aircraft carriers, with a £3.9bn line entry, are also very high profile.
• Balancing the budget around those imperatives puts two elements under threat of re-assessment: RN surface escorts and combat air platforms.  But how then to protect and defend those high-value maritime assets?
• It is likely that the RAF will have to re-balance the fast-jet front line, slicing away some of the Tranche 3 Typhoon and trading off some capability with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) which is an as yet imperfectly costed item.  JSF is/will be a vital ‘first day of war’ vehicle, bringing the RAF into the stealth era for the first time: not to be ignored given new-generation Russian and Chinese air defence missiles in the pipeline.
• With the entire RAF posture now reflecting expeditionary warfare, the key aspect of any current and future operation must be Control of the Air, be it independently achieved or with alliance contribution.  The Falklands War showed how fragile were UK forces under just marginal air cover: public and political support for operations would wither quickly were another Sir Galahad incident to appear on TV screens.  Latest aviation magazines show Iran bringing its F-14 fighter fleet back into operational use.  UK (and US) ground forces have had little if any experience of combat under air attack.  Air on air attrition has also hardly featured during the last 15 years of operations.  Complacency would be a dangerous and probably fatal option.
•  UK air defence cannot be easily put on the back burner: it is the primary function of a national air arm.  The recent re-appearance of the Russian Air and Naval Air Force probing of UK and North American air space leaves no room to doubt the need for in-place air defence for the UK territory.  Post 9/11, the threat of asymmetric air attack simply underlines the need for tight airspace control with agile air assets and the ground environment to support them.
• The asymmetric element of modern threats means that information and intelligence are even more important than in their Cold War guise.  Hence the imperative requirement for full development and deployment of the Nimrod MRA4, which is no longer only an ASW asset.  Combined with the ASTOR capabilities, and with continuing refinement of joint operation with and links to US platforms such as E8/JSTAR, these Nimrods will be a fundamental component of the overhead protection and targeting of the ground action
• Meanwhile, ageing and operationally stretched strategic and tactical lift assets – both fixed and rotary wing – are in front-line exposure with just as much intensity as the combat echelons.  Any slowdown or dilution of planned replacements for all these assets (heavy lift, tactical lift, in-flight refuelling) would steadily and irreversibly remove the flexibility currently just maintained to support the operations on the ground and in the air in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
• The target figure of 41,000 RAF personnel is declared to be sufficient for future commitments.  It is probably being approached faster than is tolerable, given the scale and tempo of operations both current and future.
• Above all, the current tempo of operations is affecting retention in the Service. This will lead to a serious dilution of operational experience and difficulties in adequately manning the front line unless corrective action is taken.

UKNDA Website – RAF Cover Article

RAF SUPPLY POLICY - JUST IN TIME OR JUST TOO LATE?

1. Current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most intensive since the Korean war, yet our armed forces are, in manpower terms, the smallest they have been since 1939. Indeed, the armed forces budget as a proportion of GDP is also the lowest it has been for decades. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall successive governments have been looking for ways to cash in on the ’Peace Dividend’ by cutting the supply support and infrastructure for the steadily reducing core manpower establishment of the armed forces. A major loser in this drive for economy has been RAF logistic support.

2. This paper, a personal view, has been written to examine the principal factors behind the change in supply policy and its effects on the RAF but might equally apply to the RN, Army and Royal Marines.

3. Policy 1990s. The RAF policy for stock holdings in the 1990s was based on a sophisticated combination of, amongst other criteria, collated past consumption data, meantime between unit failure, re-order period, reserves and where appropriate, meantime between unit replacement. A liaison was maintained between the RAF engineers who collated the technical data and the supply managers who calculated the consumption data using a global supply management computer, known as ATLAS. Using the data from ATLAS and its satellite connected deployable supply ADP system, which provided real time visibility of world wide holdings, liabilities and consumption, supply managers were able to calculate stock requirements in advance of stock exhaustion and place orders with industry within the product manufacturing lead times.

4. System Deficiencies In The 1990s. Perceived deficiencies in this system during the 1990s were very much in evidence and much staff effort was devoted to the issue. The RAF Engineering Branch knew only too well that the system was prone to failure and that ’robbing’ of unserviceable aircraft to support any given fleet was endemic. However, the reasons for these supply failures were not specifically system driven but more often than not the result of financial restrictions dictated by an ever tightening defence budget. Manipulation of the procurement parameters, through Treasury driven initiatives, designed to save money, induced stock deficiencies into the system as a calculated risk factor. It was not uncommon for the supply managers, once they had calculated a requirement, to have a Treasury induced reduction in the contract quantity. At the same time, MOD, in an effort to save money to pay for ‘Front Line First’, was reviewing the reserve and stock holding policy leading to a reduction of shelf stock. Depot stocks were targeted along with war reserves, and earmarks each contributing to savings in the defence procurement budget. The corollary was a marked reduction in the safety net previously provided by a functional, if expensive, stock holding policy.

5. Policy Post-1990s. To replace the system previously employed the post-1990s policy was predicated on a ‘pact’ with industry as outlined in one of many Government instigated consultancy papers. In effect, what the consultants offered, was a system based on minimal holdings supported by a dynamic supply chain reaching from ‘factory to fox hole‘ via ‘coupling bridges‘ (consultants jargon which basically proposed a system labelled ‘Just In Time Logistics’ which took an ‘holistic’ approach to spares support within the overall Supply Chain Management system). What this meant in practice was an ever greater reliance on the manufacturing and repair base to push supplies up the logistic pipe line as and when required negating the need for large stock reserves to be held. The current Government has overseen the introduction of Resource Accounting and Budgeting along with ‘Smart Acquisition’ and ‘Integrated Project Teams: new jargon but to what effect if the basic philosophy has not changed?

6. System Deficiencies Post-1990s. Deficiencies in the post-1990s ‘Just in Time’ philosophy were evident even before the system was implemented. For the system to succeed, it required an integrated delivery plan, close liaison with industry and, most important of all, an industrial base that could deliver on time, every time. Within the UK home base these criteria were more manageable given that a sophisticated transport system already existed (albeit at a cost) and that liaison with industry was standard MOD procurement practice. However, MOD, through its past dealings with industry knew that delivery promises were, more often than not, illusory and that when confronted by a non-MOD client competing for the same items or resources, the commercial inclination was to support the non-MOD client first, the ’Al Yamama’ contract being a case in point. Furthermore, for ’Just In Time’ to work as advertised MOD would have to be willing to pay a premium to achieve the desired dynamic ‘pipe priming’ effect. It was well understood that small quantity contracts of this nature invited extra costs because the company contracted would be unable to benefit from economies of scale and/or would have to bear the cost of stock produced against a promise of future purchases. To put it another way, the MOD might believe that they were making savings by reducing stock holdings and in transferring storage costs to industry. However, there is no such thing as a free lunch and industry would simply amortise these overheads adding, in the long term, to defence procurement inflation.

7. Policy Effects of Deployed Operation. The negative effects from this policy shift would be felt not only on deployed operations but throughout the whole supply system; in the forward areas and home base. With stockholdings reduced to the bare minimum, any unforeseen increase in consumption which could not be replaced by industry would inevitably lead to aircraft being grounded in the operational area unless home-based aircraft were ’robbed’ to fill the supply shortfall. It is axiomatic to say that the further an operation is from its home base the more vulnerable it is to logistic failure and in the past this consideration was catered for by the use of pre-stocked munitions and equipment covering a length (30 days) of deployment at various rates of effort (a cold war philosophy that did need reviewing). However, under the ’Just in Time’ policy the number of days of spares held for operations was reduced to 7 on the understanding that the logistic pipe line would take up the slack within that timeframe. When this does not happen the home base, as described above, must fill the breach from depot and unit stocks and when these are exhausted, by the expedient of ‘robbing’ non-deployed weapon systems. To replace these stocks industry must gear up and, in the first instance, provide support for front line operation(s) before re-stocking the home base units. In the meantime the home base is restricted in its ability to carry out essential training and replacement activities. We see the effects today in Urgent Operational Requirements being ever more required, helicopter and transport aircraft shortages in operational theatres and the time bomb of increased flying hours for all RAF operational aircraft. These latter effects lead to, at best, reduced fleet availability and at worst, the possibility of catastrophic aircraft structural failure.

8. When industry is unable to meet the requirement to prime the logistic pipeline, either because of competition for resources or Government under-funding, support to the front line suffers and by definition the home base becomes moribund. In these circumstances ‘Just In Time’ may be ’Just Too Late’. Whilst a change in logistic support systems may well have been warranted in order to secure a ‘Peace Dividend’ it is by no means certain that the ’Just in Time’ philosophy adopted by the government of the day, with its attendant caveats, was the best solution. Saving money in the long term must be measured against any extra expense and inefficiency incurred in the short term to overcome logistic shortfalls in support for the front line. In an environment of continual budget decline vis-à-vis GDP accompanied by defence procurement inflation, the effects are inevitable: a steady degradation in supply and operational support. Ultimately an already ageing and declining aircraft fleet must be reduced still further through ’robbing’ and attrition.

9. All the above factors lead to severe strain on an already overstretched defence budget, a situation which can only be corrected by this Government providing a substantial cash injection and review of the current supply policy. It was recognised in the late 1990s that shortages would accrue from the ’Just In Time’ philosophy and that robbing Peter to pay Paul would continue to be used to overcome short-term deficiencies. However, following ’Options for Change’, in the mid to late 1990s, the assumption was that only one major operation would be carried out at a time, with a recuperation period built in before any new deployment. Afghanistan and Kosovo were ongoing operations prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and there was no recuperation period for the forces, either in Iraq or Afghanistan, despite the overlapping commitments. This was a Government induced foreign policy that breached the fundamental assumptions upon which the Armed Forces were then funded.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With two large war fighting operations and several smaller concurrent commitments major procurement programmes are suffering reductions, deferral or cancellation and a flawed and under-funded supply system is creaking under the pressure. Therefore the following recommendations should be put forward by UKNDA:

a. Major procurement project budgets ( eg JSF, aircraft carriers, FRES ) should be ring-fenced in order to stand alone so as not to affect current supply support or operational funding.

b. Sufficient funding (3% of GDP as a starting point) should be provided to allow MOD priority and surety of access to industrial production when it is needed and to provide increased safety stock levels.

c. An integrated/joint transport plan should be put in place that allows for delivery from ‘factory to foxhole’, including funding of the necessary military/civil air, road, rail and sea assets capable of operating along a hostile Main Supply Route.

d. The liaison between MOD, industry and the end user should be ‘beefed up’ and given ministerial weight to ensure contract delivery targets are always met by a pro-armed forces commercial sector.

Sqn Ldr D N P Tisdale MILT RAF (Ret’d)

RAF Affairs UKNDA